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INTRODUCTION 
Admiral James Stavridis collapsed in his chair, exhausted. The 
four-star Navy admiral had just finished a six-month whirlwind 
tour of over thirty nations, flying on a state-of-the-art military 
aircraft surrounded by an enormous staff. He met with leaders from 
every member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
the heads of Russia and Israel, and several prospective U.S. and 
NATO allies. Not surprisingly, he met with each nation’s senior 
military leaders and ministers of defense in an effort to strengthen 
military-to-military relations and reinforce the bonds of the Atlantic 
Alliance that date back to General Eisenhower and the end of the 
Second World War.  
Perhaps surprisingly, Admiral Stavridis also met with the 
presidents of each nation, their foreign ministers, and a host of 
diplomats. It was easy for his staff to set up meetings with just 
about anyone in Europe. Indeed, everyone was clamoring to meet 
Admiral Stavridis, the senior U.S. military officer in Europe who 
possessed enormous operational authorities central to their own 
nation’s defense. He also brought with him the promise of foreign 
military sales, future military funding, and easy access to the vast 
Washington national security apparatus. To many, he was the most 
important American on the continent, a man worth knowing, and 
someone possessing not just a military role but also an expanding 
foreign relations role. When he called, presidents and prime 
ministers picked up the phone and made time.1  
What position in the vast military bureaucracy did Admiral 
Stavridis hold? He had just been appointed by the President and 
confirmed by Congress as the leader of the U.S. European 
Command, one of five extraterritorial U.S. geographic combatant 
commanders.2 These positions play an increasingly important but 
not well-understood role in the largest military (and bureaucracy) 
in the world. The 1947 National Security Act established these 
 
 1  This vignette is largely borrowed from JAMES STAVRIDIS, THE ACCIDENTAL ADMIRAL: A 
SAILOR TAKES COMMAND AT NATO 28–30 (2014). In addition to his position as U.S. European 
Commander, Admiral Stavridis was “dual-hatted” as NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe. Id.  
 2  Donna Miles, Senate Confirms McChrystal, Stavridis, Fraser Nominations, AM. FORCES 
PRESS SERVICES (June 11, 2009), http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=54734.  
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roles3 which some commentators have described as “viceroys”4 or 
modern-day Roman “proconsuls.”5 But their full authorities lay 
dormant for almost forty years only to be fully actuated in 1986 via 
the Goldwater-Nichols Act.6 These combatant commanders lie at 
the heart of what I refer to as the operational military, and their 
authorities and influence are growing, largely unrestrained by 
Congress and the Executive Branch.   
Most reasonably well-informed people believe that executive 
authority over the military has grown at the expense of 
congressional authority for a variety of reasons, including 
congressional dysfunction, some version of an “executive unbound,” 
or an “Imperial Presidency” further facilitated by the nature of 
modern warfare.7 That is not untrue, but it is only part of a much 
larger story. Another part of the story—largely unexplored by 
existing legal scholarship—is the military’s legal architecture and 
agency design.  
This Article offers a new way to think about the military. In doing 
so, I argue that there are, in fact, two militaries residing within the 
Department of Defense (DoD): an “operational” and an 
“administrative” military.8 Each military has its own chain of 
command, of critical importance to a hierarchical federal agency 
that is backed by the force of criminal law. Understanding this dual-
military bureaucracy reveals insights into national security 
 
 3  50 U.S.C. § 401 (2012).  
 4  Derek S. Reveron & Michelle D. Gavin, American Viceroys, in AMERICA’S VICEROYS: THE 
MILITARY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 1, 2 (Derek S. Reveron ed., 2004). 
 5  DANA PRIEST, THE MISSION: WAGING WAR AND KEEPING PEACE WITH AMERICA’S 
MILITARY 70 (2003). 
 6  See Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 
99-433, 100 Stat. 992, 992 (1986) (stating its goal is “to place clear responsibility on the 
commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands”).  
 7  See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 15 (2010) (“[L]aw does little to constrain the modern executive . . . .”); 
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY ix (1973) (“The assumption of that 
[war-making] power by the Presidency was gradual and usually under the demand or pretext 
of emergency. It was as much a matter of congressional abdication as of presidential 
usurpation.”). And Congress no longer declares war—the last declaration of war dates from 
1942. See Garance Franke-Ruta, All the Previous Declarations of War, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 
31, 2013) https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/08/all-the-previous-declarations-
of-war/279246 (noting declarations against Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania). 
 8  I am the first legal scholar to describe the DoD’s agency design as a two-military divide 
with these terms. 
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governance with broad implications for how administrative law 
interacts with the military and civilian oversight of the military.  
The terms “administrative military” and “operational military” 
are wholly absent from the text of the Constitution, and neither is 
defined in law, regulation, or existing legal scholarship.9 The first 
military, the operational military, is led by uniformed combatant 
commanders and receives direction from the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Already powerful, these combatant 
commanders’ powers are increasing.10 They not only plan and fight 
the nation’s wars; they now perform an expanding menu of non-
traditional military functions including foreign relations-type 
functions that have historically been the province of the State 
Department.11 Today’s combatant commanders have a continuous 
presence abroad with massive staffs, resources, and forces.12 As 
State Department personnel is reduced and its funding slashed, 
combatant commanders fill the foreign policy void as the default 
American representatives abroad.13  
The operational military’s origins can be found in the 
Constitution, statute and military doctrine.14 It is responsible for 
planning and executing the nation’s war fighting, training foreign 
forces, military-to-military engagement, and an increasing range of 
 
 9  The Commander in Chief Clause ensures that there is an elected civilian head of the 
military. See U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the 
Army and Navy of the United States . . . .”); see also Christopher M. Bourne, Unintended 
Consequences of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, 18 JOINT FORCES QUART. 99, 100 (1998) (“The 
Constitution fails to specify where the authority of the Commander in Chief ends and that of 
Congress begins.”).  
 10  See, e.g., Reveron & Gavin, supra note 4, at 1–8 (describing the increased powers and 
influence of combatant commanders). 
 11  See ROSA BROOKS, HOW EVERYTHING BECAME WAR AND THE MILITARY BECAME 
EVERYTHING 79 (2016) (“Across the board, the military was moving into areas more 
traditionally conceived of as civilian domains . . . [such as] the business of health care, 
education, news and information, economic development, and local politics.”); PRIEST, supra 
note 5, at 61–65 (describing the rise of combatant commanders and their role in foreign 
policy).  
 12  See Combatant Commands, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., https://www.defense.gov/Know-Your-
Military/Combatant-Commands/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (describing and providing 
additional information on the current DoD international combatant commands).  
 13  See BROOKS, supra note 11, at 102 (discussing the consequences of reducing professional 
Foreign Service officers).  
 14  See infra Part II (explaining the origins of the operational and administrative 
militaries).  
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foreign-relations activities.15 It receives its forces (personnel, 
equipment, weapons) from the administrative military.16 
Uniformed combatant commanders and subordinate joint task force 
commanders lead the operational military.17 Its day-to-day 
implementation is governed by the doctrinal terms of combatant 
command, operational control, and tactical control.18  
The administrative military’s origins can be found in the 
Constitution, statutes, and military doctrine.19 Its functions include 
personnel management, staffing, recruiting, testing, training, 
health care, equipping and hardware acquisition.20 It also provides 
forces to the operational military.21 The civilian Secretaries of the 
 
 15  The DoD and other governmental agencies also have an enormous intelligence 
apparatus reporting to the Director of National Intelligence pursuant to the existing 
intelligence statutory framework dating from 2004. It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
discuss the institutional mechanics of the intelligence community, but the operational and 
administrative military divide has enormous follow-on consequences within the intelligence 
community due to the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act and the 
creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. See 50 U.S.C. § 401 (2012) et. 
seq. (declaring the purposes and functions of the United States military).  Further, while this 
Article focuses on the administrative military, there is a sub-section of the administrative 
military—the military defense agencies—that adds an additional layer of complexity to any 
analysis, but which is beyond the scope of this Article. These seventeen defense agencies, 
including the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the Defense Finance and Accounting 
Service (DFAS), account for an enormous budget ($85-90 billion) but are not the focus of the 
Secretary of Defense or Congress and are subject to only sporadic oversight. 30 Years of 
Goldwater-Nichols Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 114th Cong. 50 
(2015) (statement of Dr. John Hamre, President and Chief Executive Officer, Center for 
Strategic and International Studies) [hereinafter Goldwater-Nichols Hearing]; see also $125 
Billion in Savings Ignored: Review of DoD’s Efficiency Study: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Oversight and Government Reform, 115th Cong. 2–3 (2017) (prepared testimony of 
Lawrence J. Korb) (“[Secretary of the Navy] Ray Mabus . . . complained that 20 [percent] of 
the defense budget . . . went to the so-called ‘Fourth Estate,’ that is, the defense agencies . . . 
that provide support to the armed forces. He called this pure overhead.”).  
 16  See infra Parts II.B–C, III.  
 17  See infra Parts II.B–C, III. The definition is largely derived from (1) Article II of the 
Constitution to include the Commander in Chief clause; (2) statutes addressing the roles and 
responsibility of the combatant commanders; and (3) the law of the chain of command and 
military doctrine to include combatant command control, operational control, and tactical 
control.  
 18  See infra Part III.B. 
 19  See infra Parts II.B–C. 
 20  See infra Parts II–III. 
 21  I define “forces” broadly as set forth in DoD’s Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms to include “[a]n aggregation of military personnel, weapon systems, equipment, and 
necessary support, or combination thereof . . . [or a] major subdivision of a fleet.” DEP’T OF 
DEF., JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02: DEP’T OF DEF. DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED 
TERMS 89 (as amended through Feb. 2016) [hereinafter DOD DICTIONARY]. 
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military departments and the uniformed heads of each military 
branch—the service “chiefs”—largely lead the administrative 
military.22 Its implementation is governed by the doctrinal term 
administrative control.23  
The administrative military serves the operational military.24 
While both militaries ultimately report to the Secretary of Defense 
and the Commander in Chief, the administrative military remains 
the outsized focus of congressional oversight.25  
The two-military divide creates two main problems: (1) it 
incentivizes congressional focus on the administrative military at 
the expense of operational military oversight; and (2) it facilitates 
an internal bureaucratic misalignment in which the administrative 
military too often provides the wrong forces (personnel, equipment, 
weaponry) to the operational military.  
Today, the DoD is the world’s largest bureaucracy and 
employer.26 Its organizational set-up is complex, its size vast, and 
its mission idiosyncratic: the DoD is responsible for the nation’s 
defense including the lawful application of military force to fight 
and win the nation’s wars.27 The very nature of its activities raises 
 
 22  See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 5013 (2012) (describing the administrative duties of the Secretary 
of the Navy). The military often uses outdated terminology to refer to these Title 10 functions 
as “man, train, and equip.” I intentionally use the gender-neutral term “staffing” to better 
reflect the important role that women play in the Armed Forces and the current “no 
exceptions” combat policy. 
 23  See infra Parts II.B–C, III. This definition is derived from (1) Article I of the 
Constitution; (2) statutes addressing the roles and responsibility of the Secretaries of the 
Military Departments; and (3) the law of the chain of command and military doctrine to 
include administrative control.  
 24  See infra Parts II.B–C, III. 
 25  See infra Part III. 
 26  See Niall McCarthy, The World’s Biggest Employers, FORBES (June 23, 201 5, 8:20 AM),  
https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2015/06/23/the-worlds-biggest-employers-
infographic/#104f459c686b (“[T]he US Department of Defense boasts a workforce of 3.2 
million people, making it the largest global employer.”).  
 27  Forest L. Reinhardt & Michael W. Toffel, Managing Climate Change: Lessons from the 
U.S. Navy, HARV. BUS. REV. July/Aug. 2017, at 104 (describing one of the fundamental 
purposes of the Navy is to “maintain . . . forces capable of winning wars”). “Military 
organizations are idiosyncratic and special. Their primary ‘output’ is lethal force, controlled 
in ways that compel people to do what they don’t want to do. No legitimate firm does anything 
remotely comparable.” Id. The DoD mission statement states that it “shall maintain and use 
armed forces to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, 
foreign and domestic; [e]nsure, by timely and effective military action, the security of the 
United States, its possessions, and areas vital to its interest; [u]phold and advance the 
national policies and interests of the United States.” DEP’T OF DEF., DEP’T OF DEF. DIR. 
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questions: How is this agency designed? Does the governing agency 
design strengthen or undermine civilian control of the military? 
How is the DoD—as a federal agency—subject to the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) and how are its actions subject to judicial 
review?   
The answer lies with a fuller understanding of DoD’s unique and 
complex agency design that allocates power within the 
government’s largest agency.28 Consider the following examples: 
Militarization of Foreign Policy. The existing legal architecture 
establishes a set of richly resourced and permanent geographic 
combatant commanders stationed overseas that are the heart of the 
operational military.29 They remain busy in war and peace.30 These 
commands reside throughout the world with personnel and 
resources far outpacing the State Department’s size and budget.31 
Not only do these combatant commanders plan and fight the 
 
5100.01: FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND ITS MAJOR COMPONENTS (Dec. 21, 
2010).  
 28  For a discussion of the importance of agency design and the allocation of power within 
agencies, see Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 
YALE L. J. 1032, 1057 (2011); see also Robert Knowles, Warfare as Regulation, 74 WASH. & 
LEE. L. REV 1953, 1955 (2017) (arguing that the U.S. government’s national security activities 
are a form of regulatory action); Matthew Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age 
of Terror, 64 STAN. L. REV. 289, 290–91 (2012) (describing the traditional national security 
scholarship focus). Understanding the DoD’s agency design helps answer the question: where 
does all the money go? See, e.g., Craig Whitlock & Bob Woodward, Pentagon Buries Evidence 
of $125 billion in Bureaucratic Waste, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2016, at A1 (“The Pentagon has 
buried an internal study that exposed $125 billion in administrative waste in its business 
operations amid fears Congress would use the findings as an excuse to slash the defense 
budget . . . .”). 
 29  See ANDREW FEICKERT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42077, THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN 
AND COMBATANT COMMANDS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1–3 (2013) (outlining 
the provisions of the Unified Command plan which allows the DoD to create and maintain 
the functional combatant commands and the geographic combatant commands).  
 30  See id. at 25 (noting, for example, that the U.S. Transportation Command is charged to 
provide transportation services regardless of whether it is peacetime or wartime).  
 31  See RONAN FARROW, WAR ON PEACE: THE END OF DIPLOMACY AND THE DECLINE OF 
AMERICAN INFLUENCE 292 (2018) (noting that the U.S. State Department spent about $666 
million on public diplomacy abroad in one recent year). The Trump Administration sought a 
9.4% increase in the FY2018 DoD’s budget and a 30% decrease in the State Department 
budget. See Robbie Gramer, Dan De Luce, & Colum Lynch, How the Trump Administration 
Broke the State Department, FOREIGN POLICY (Jul. 31, 2017) 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/31/how-the-trump-administration-broke-the-state-
department/ (“[T]he administration drafted up plans to slash State and foreign aid funding 
and to let go of top career professionals . . . .”).  
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nation’s wars, but they are taking on an increasing role in foreign 
policy.32 
Imbalance in Congressional Testimony. Each year, congressional 
committees with military oversight responsibilities hear testimony 
from civilian and uniformed military leadership.33 The uniformed 
geographic combatant commanders—the heads of the operational 
military—are normally required to testify before Congress just once 
a year, and the nature of their testimony is qualitatively different: 
they often seek increased funding and resources.34 In contrast, the 
administrative military leaders testify in front of Congress in far 
greater numbers, and are more likely to be called to the 
congressional carpet whenever there is a scandal, regardless of its 
nature.35  
Congressional Funding. Each year, Congress passes the National 
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), a massive funding bill that 
serves as a yearly litmus test for determining congressional 
priorities over the DoD.36 This funding bill is heavily focused on the 
 
 32  See Edward Marks, Rethinking the Geographic Combatant Commands, 1 INTERAGENCY 
JOURNAL 19, 19–20 (2010) (“[T]he military services have increasingly become the default 
option for U.S. government action and response.”). 
 33  See, e.g., HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, 116TH CONG., Rules of the Committee on 
Armed Services, https://armedservices.house.gov/committee-rules#B503BFCA-B011-4BA0-
A5DF-1786995BCC5F (noting the process for receiving testimony from individuals called 
before the committee).  
 34  See FEICKERT, supra note 29, at 1 (“All Combatant Commanders testify to the Armed 
Services Committees on an annual basis about their posture and budgetary requirements . . 
. .”). The combatant commanders normally testify just once a year via “posture statements.” 
See generally PATRICK J. MURPHY & MARK MILLEY, 114TH CONG., A STATEMENT ON THE 
POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 2016 (2016), https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/
rv7/aps/aps_2016.pdf. 
 35  For example, in the recent mishap involving a ship collision in the Navy’s Seventh Fleet, 
the heads of the administrative military were called before Congress. See Robert Faturechi 
et al., Years of Warnings, then Death and Disaster: How the Navy Failed its Sailors, 
PROPUBLICA (Feb. 7, 2019) https://features.propublica.org/navy-accidents/us-navy-crashes-
japan-cause-mccain/.  Indeed, “Congress regularly calls the Service Secretary or Service Chief 
on the carpet when investigating the latest acquisition foibles, even though they are not in 
the acquisition management chain of command.”  CLARK A. MURDOCK ET AL., BEYOND 
GOLDWATER-NICHOLS: U.S. GOVERNMENT AND DEFENSE REFORM FOR A NEW STRATEGIC ERA 
94 (2005).  
 36  See Nick Schifrin, What’s in the Defense Authorization Act, PBS NEWS HOUR (Aug. 13, 
2018, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/whats-in-the-defense-authorization-act (“[The 
NDAA] is also a Congressional expression of concern and even a means of restraint . . . .”).  
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administrative military while granting the operational military 
considerably greater discretion over spending.37  
Special Operations and the Rise of “Secret Wars.” U.S. Special 
Operations Forces today function as part of a super combatant 
command.38 They operate almost everywhere—in 138 nations of the 
world in 2016.39 They now shoulder the bulk of U.S. military’s 
casualties.40 As they are employed in new ways— including covert 
actions that are purposely kept out of the public eye—congressional 
oversight has lagged.41 Congress has facilitated their rise with an 
increased budget, personnel, and legal authorities without a 
corresponding increase in oversight.42  
The Operational/Administrative Disconnect. The two-military 
divide also creates a practical problem: too often the administrative 
 
 37  For example, the NDAA focuses on core aspects of the administrative military (health 
care, administration, personnel, etc). In the FY18 NDAA, there are 47 titles covering 740 
pages addressing a wide variety of DoD activities. Of the 47 titles, only five address in any 
meaningful way operational military matters as defined earlier. See generally National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, H.R. 2810, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 38  Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is the only military command specifically 
established by Congress. See 10 U.S.C. § 167(a) (2012) (“[T]he President, through the 
Secretary of Defense, shall establish under section 161 of this title, a unified combatant 
command for special operations forces . . . .”). 
 39  See, e.g., Nick Turse, American Special Ops Forces Have Deployed to 70 Percent of the 
World’s Countries in 2017, THE NATION (June 26, 2017) 
https://www.thenation.com/article/american-special-ops-forces-have-deployed-to-70-percent-
of-the-worlds-countries-in-2017/. 
 40  See Dave Phillips, Special Operations Troops Top Casualty List as U.S. Relies More on 
Elite Forces, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/us/navy-seal-
william-ryan-owens-dead-yemen.html 
 41  See Nick Turse, Special Operations Forces Continue to Expand Across the World 
– Without Congressional Oversight, THE NATION (July 17, 2018), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/special-operations-forces-continue-expand-across-world-
without-congressional-oversight/ (noting that “unless they end in disaster, most missions 
remain in the shadows, unknown to all but a few Americans”). Covert action is defined as 
“[a]n activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, 
or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States 
Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.” 50 U.S.C. § 3093(e) (Supp, II 
2015) (emphasis added).  
 42  During the recent military tragedy in Niger and Mali, where four U.S. special forces 
personnel were killed, Senators Schumer (D-NY) and Graham (R-SC), both charged with 
military oversight, professed ignorance about the fact that the U.S. military was even present 
in that part of the world. See Dionne Searcey & Eric Schmitt, In Niger, Where U.S. Troops 
Died, a Lawless and Shifting Landscape, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2017, at A5 (quoting Senator 
Graham as stating, “[w]e don’t know exactly where we’re at in the world, militarily, and what 
we’re doing”).  
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military provides the operational military with the wrong “stuff.”43 
Or it provides equipment that the operational military does not 
want or need at significant taxpayer expense.44 
In Part II, I propose this new two-military analytical framework. 
This Part begins with a brief historical overview of the dual-military 
state and argues that these two militaries coexisted in some form 
since the nation’s founding, grew further apart following World War 
II and the National Security Act, and effectively separated following 
the passage of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. 
Part III analyzes the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. This Act, 
largely unexamined by existing legal scholarship, establishes the 
lawful civil-military chain of command, critical to ensuring objective 
civilian control of the military. Under the DoD’s agency design, the 
civilian Secretaries of the military departments are effectively 
relegated to a secondary role as the heads of the administrative 
military, in support of the uniformed military combatant 
commanders.45 The operational military commanders, in turn, are 
increasingly delegated broader war-making authorities, 
accelerating independent executive action at the expense of 
congressional oversight.46  
Part IV addresses the two-military divide’s consequences, many 
unintended. Adrian Vermeule, David Dyzenahus, and other 
scholars have described the emergence of aptly named “black holes” 
 
 43  See, e.g., Marcus Weisgerber, Slow and Steady is Losing the Defense Acquisition Race, 
GOV’T EXEC. (Nov. 11, 2014), https://www.goveexec.com/magazine/features/2014/11/slow-and-
steady-losing-defense-acquisition-race/ (stating that an October poll “found more than 25 
percent of Defense personnel were not at all confident that the acquisition process provides 
the military services with the weapons they need”).  
 44  Secretary of Defense Robert Gates struggled mightily to provide armored vehicles to the 
operational military during the heaviest fighting in Afghanistan, but he ran up against 
administrative military headwinds that fought his requests at every turn. Ultimately, even 
Gates was forced to work around the Goldwater-Nichols-designed bureaucracy that he was 
leading. See ROBERT GATES, DUTY: MEMOIRS OF A SECRETARY OF WAR 25, 120–23 (2014) 
(chronicling the administrative difficulties Gates faced in providing armored vehicles to 
operational forces). 
 45  See 10 U.S.C. § 162(a) (2012) (“[T]he Secretaries of the military departments shall 
assign specified forces under their jurisdiction to unified and specified combatant commands 
. . . to perform missions assigned to those commands.”). Within joint doctrine, the critical term 
“forces” is defined broadly. See DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 126. 
 46  Harold Koh has stated that in matters of national security, the Executive Branch action 
“nearly always wins” due to a combination of executive initiative, congressional acquiescence, 
and judicial deference. HAROLD KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING 
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 137–46 (1990). 
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and “grey holes” and their effects on administrative law governance 
during times of war and emergency.47 Such holes serve as legal trap 
doors that exempt or modify oversight over certain agency actions 
depending on external factors.48 But there are also internal factors 
unique to DoD and its organizational design—what I refer to as 
“institutional holes”—where administrative law may or may not 
apply. And within these institutional holes, governmental actions 
are often shrouded in secrecy—itself a form of regulation.49  
Part V addresses several independent accelerants of this two-
military divide. Finally, Part VI provides initial recommendations 
with an eye toward strengthening civilian control of the operational 
military and reforming national security governance. A brief 
conclusion follows. 
II. FROM THE NATION’S FOUNDING TO THE COLD WAR: THE TWO 
MILITARIES’ ORIGINS  
Despite being hailed as a critical component and legacy of the 
U.S. constitutional system, the phrase “civilian control of the 
military” is wholly absent from the Constitution’s text.50 Indeed, 
civilian control of the military is best understood as a longstanding 
constitutional norm that can only be gleaned from the 
Constitution’s text—in particular, from its placement of an elected 
civilian President as head of the Army and Navy.51 Today, civilian 
control of the military is implemented via governing statutes, 
particularly the Goldwater-Nichols Act.52 This reinforces civilian 
 
 47  DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 2 
(2006); Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1132 
(2009). 
 48  The term legal “black hole” was first used to describe the inapplicability of law to 
Guantanamo Bay detainees in the aftermath of 9/11. See DYZENHAUS, supra note 47, at 2..  
 49  See id; see also Vermeule, supra note 47, at 1112 (describing how the early APA 
exemptions as applied to the military are “rarely litigated”). 
 50  See PETER D. FEAVER, ARMED SERVANTS: AGENCY, OVERSIGHT, AND CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS 81 (2003) (discussing that civilian control of the military is implied by “the 
presence of senior civilian officials in the Department of Defense”); see also Christopher M. 
Bourne, Unintended Consequences of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, 18 JOINT FORCES QUART. 99, 
100 (1998) (discussing the phrase “civilian control of the army”). 
 51   U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 52  See Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 
99-433, 100 Stat. 992 (1986) (stating the purpose of the Act is to “strengthen civilian authority 
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control of the military through the formation of a lawful chain of 
command that subordinates the military to civilian oversight.53  
A. THE TWO-MILITARY GLOSSARY AND OVERVIEW OF KEY TERMS 
Before I dive into the history and particulars of the DoD’s legal 
architecture, we begin with a brief glossary of the relevant terms. 
The following five key terms in particular are essential to 
understanding the two-military state. These definitions can be 
traced to existing law, regulation, or doctrine.  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS): By law, the CJCS 
is the principal military advisor to the President, Secretary of 
Defense, National Security Council, and Homeland Security 
Council for all military matters including the promulgation of joint 
doctrine.54 The CJCS lacks formal command authority55 but has 
enormous informal authority, communicating operational military 
orders to combatant and joint task force commanders. Members of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff include the uniformed “service Chiefs,” but 
they lack a discrete line of communication to the President and 
Secretary of Defense.56  
Combatant Commanders: Within the operational military, 
combatant commanders are uniformed, four-star military officers 
who head one of the ten combatant commands and lead the 
operational military.57 The five extraterritorial geographic 
combatant commanders as well as Special Operations Command 
(SOCOM) are the operational military’s true “heart.” They exercise 
 
in the Department of Defense . . . [and] to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the 
unified and specified combatant commands”). 
 53  Id.  
 54  10 U.S.C. §§ 151, 153 (2012). 
 55  See id. at § 153 (noting that all of the responsibilities and functions of the CJCS are 
subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and Secretary of Defense).  
 56  See DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT PUBLICATION 1: DOCTRINE FOR THE ARMED FORCES OF THE 
UNITED STATES, II-9, III-4, III-5 (as amended through Mar. 25, 2013) [hereinafter JOINT 
PUBLICATION 1].  
 57  As of this writing, the ten combatant commands include six geographic commands: five 
overseas—Africa Command, Central Command, European Command, Northern Command, 
Indo-Pacific Command, and Southern Command—and four functional combatant 
commands—Cyber Command, Strategic Command, Special Operations Command, and 
Transportation Command. Combatant Commands, supra note 12.   
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an increasingly important but not well-understood role in national 
security law and governance.58 
Secretaries of military departments: Within the administrative 
military, these politically appointed, civilian heads of the three 
military departments (Army, Navy, & Air Force) lead the 
administrative military and provide oversight over the uniformed 
service “chiefs.”59  
Joint: “[A]ctivities, operations, organizations, etc., in which 
elements of two or more military departments participate.”60 
B. THE EXECUTIVE-OPERATIONAL NEXUS AND CONGRESSIONAL-
ADMINISTRATIVE NEXUS61 
The operational military has existed in some capacity since our 
nation’s founding.62 Its primary legal authority can be found within 
the text of the Constitution, particularly in the Commander in Chief 
clause: “[T]he President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army 
of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when 
called into the actual service of the United States.”63  
The precise scope of this authority has befuddled scholars and 
jurists since the Constitution’s inception.64 Despite its clear modern-
 
 58  See FEICKERT, supra note 29, at 1 (noting that the combatant commands are the 
“embodiment of U.S. policy both at home and abroad”).  
 59  Under existing law, the Marine Corps is part of the Department of the Navy. 10 U.S.C. 
§ 5061 (2012); see also HEIDI M. PETERS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R7-5700, DEFENSE PRIMER: 
THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS 1–2 (updated Nov. 28, 2018) (reviewing the composition of the 
three military departments, how they were appointed, and their oversight of chiefs).  
 60  DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 283.  
 61  Broadly speaking, Congress has the constitutional power of the “purse” while the 
executive has the power of the “sword.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The 
Executive not only dispenses the honors but holds the sword of the community. The 
legislature not only commands the purse but prescribes the rules by which the duties and 
rights of every citizen are to be regulated.”).  
 62  See ROBERT K. WRIGHT, THE CONTINENTAL ARMY 10–12, 23 (1983) (stating that the First 
Continental Congress rejected the idea of creating a national militia force, but the Second 
Continental Congress did establish a Continental Army in 1775). Both the Continental Army 
and Continental Navy existed prior to the ratification of the Constitution. See, e.g., Mark P. 
Nevitt, Unintended Consequences: The Posse Comitatus Act in the Modern Era, 36 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 119, 161 (2014) (stating that the Continental Navy was founded in 1775 and the Coast 
Guard was founded in 1790). 
 63  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 64  Justice Jackson famously stated, “A judge, like an executive adviser, may be surprised 
at the poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems of 
executive power as they actually present themselves. Just what our forefathers did envision, 
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day importance for defining the scope of operational military 
matters, the clause was not discussed during the Constitutional 
Convention.65 While the exact breadth and scope of this authority 
are not without limit, it has been consistently understood to include 
the authority to command and control military operations.66 While 
a comprehensive review of the President’s powers as Commander in 
Chief is beyond the scope of this Article, two views emerged during 
the nation’s founding that are particularly relevant to the modern 
military divide.  
The first view, held by Anti-Federalists and Thomas Jefferson, 
reflected an abiding faith in citizen-militias and possessed a 
profound suspicion of federal standing armies.67 The second view, 
shared by the Federalists and Alexander Hamilton, favored 
centralization, envisioned the young nation’s need for standing 
armies and navies, and favored more streamlined authority and 
rapid executive action.68 In The Federalist Papers, Hamilton wrote 
that the authority of the Commander in Chief “would amount to 
nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the 
military and naval forces, as first [g]eneral and admiral of the 
[c]onfederacy.”69 Hamilton stated that the Commander in Chief had 
the authority over the tactical movement of troops and vessels, 
 
or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern conditions, must be divined from 
materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for 
Pharaoh.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 65  See generally, Documents from the Continental Congress and Constitutional Convention, 
1774 to 1789, LIBRARY OF CONG.: DIGITAL COLLECTIONS https://www.loc.gov/collections/
continental-congress-and-constitutional-convention-from-1774-to-1789/about-this-collection/ 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2019) (not discussing the Commander in Chief clause in any of the 
documents preserved from the Constitutional Convention).  
 66  See Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 615 (1850) (stating that the Commander-in-Chief 
power is “purely military”).  
 67  See Earl F. Martin, America’s Anti-Standing Army Tradition and the Separate 
Community Doctrine, 76 MISS. L.J. 135, 180 (2006) (“[T]he Anti-Federalists generally held 
the idea of a national standing army in contempt, while bestowing praise upon the citizen 
militia.”). 
 68  See ROBERT CHERNOW, HAMILTON 253–60 (2004); Goldwater-Nichols Hearing, supra 
note 15, at 36 (statement of Jim Thomas, Vice-President and Director of Studies, Center for 
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) (“The way we do command and control in the 
American military is exceptional . . . . [W]e have had a tension, since the founding of the 
Republic, between a Jeffersonian aversion to . . . the concentration of power in any military 
officer versus the Hamiltonian impulse toward centralization and effectiveness.”). 
 69  THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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foreshadowing doctrinal authorities integral to the modern 
operational military.70  
This authority was understood to authorize the President to take 
command of the troops in the field; indeed, President Washington 
once did just that, personally commanding militia forces in the 
Whiskey Rebellion of 1794.71 This authority also found support in 
the Supreme Court. In 1850, Chief Justice Taney, speaking for the 
Court in Fleming v. Page, emphasized the President’s tactical 
command over military forces during military operations: “As 
commander-in-chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the 
naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to 
employ them in the manner he may deem effectual to harass and 
conquer and subdue the enemy.”72 
The earliest views of the Commander in Chief’s authority as the 
tactical and operational leader of the armed forces live on in the 
operational military’s definition and in modern legal and doctrinal 
authorities. In contrast, the administrative military’s origins are 
more closely aligned with congressional authorities within the 
Constitution’s text.73 At the time of the Constitutional Convention, 
the issue of standing armies (where they should come from—states 
or federal—and who should control them) was hotly debated.74  
Under the Constitution’s text, Congress controls all military 
appropriations which include the “power of the purse” and oversight 
over the DoD’s annual budget.75 Congress also has the power to 
“declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make 
 
 70  Id. 
 71  See Nigel Anthony Sellars, Treasonous Tenant Farmers and Seditious Sharecroppers: 
The 1917 Green Corn Rebellion Trials, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1097, 1104 (2002) (discussing 
President George Washington’s role in the Whiskey Rebellion).  
 72  Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 615 (1850) (emphasis added).  
 73  The preamble of the Constitution foreshadows the modern military’s mission when it 
states its goal as “to form a more perfect Union . . . and [to] provide for the common Defence.” 
U.S. CONST. pmbl. Further, Congress “provide[s] for the common Defence and general 
Welfare of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.1.  
 74  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining how the proposition of 
standing armies is problematic); see also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND 
IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 185–86 (1996) (discussing the Anti-Federalist 
view on standing armies). 
 75  U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 1. Each year, Congress passes the yearly National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA), an enormous piece of annual legislation that can surpass 1,000 
pages. The majority of the subject matter is focused on administrative matters. See, e.g., 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, supra note 37. 
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Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.”76 Congress has the 
authority to “raise and support [a]rmies” (limited to two years) and 
“provide and maintain a Navy” (no time limitation)77 as well as the 
constitutional authority to make regulations governing the Armed 
Forces.78 In addition, under the Constitution’s Militia clauses, 
Congress has the power “to provide for calling forth the Militia to 
execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections, and repel 
Invasions”79 and the power “[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and 
disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may 
be employed in the Service of the United States.”80 
Although neither the Federalists nor the anti-Federalists could 
have anticipated the modern military’s massive size, their 
competing visions continue to play out in the two-military divide. 
Indeed, the seeds for a two-military division were sown from the 
nation’s founding. For example, the Hamiltonian vision of a 
centralized, effective, and efficient Executive and military is best 
reflected in the operational military with its comparably shorter 
chain of command and efficiency while the anti-Federalist vision of 
a more diffuse, de-centralized power structure lives on in the 
administrative military.  
 The size of the military waxed and waned throughout American 
history until the end of World War II.81 Standing armies became a 
permanent fixture with the emergence of the Cold War, and the 
National Security Act of 1947 created the modern military 
infrastructure, discussed below.82  
C. THE TWO MILITARIES’ STATUTORY ORIGINS: THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY ACT (1947) AND THE RISE OF STANDING ARMIES AND NAVIES 
The National Security Act of 1947 established the modern 
national security organizational structure and core institutions that 
 
 76  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 11. 
 77  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12–13. See generally Dakota Rudesill, The Land and Naval 
Forces Clauses, 86 U. CIN. L. REV. 391 (2018). 
 78  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.  
 79  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. 
 80  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
 81  See DEP’T OF DEF., SELECTED MANPOWER STATISTICS: FISCAL YEAR 1997 46–51, tbl. 2-
11 (1997) (displaying the number of American active duty military personnel in all recorded 
years from 1789 to 1997).  
 82  National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 253, 61 Stat. 495.  
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continue in some form to this day.83 Specifically, it created the 
National Military Establishment (now the DoD), Central 
Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, and the Secretary 
of Defense.84 It also established the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, ensuring civilian oversight over the entire military 
apparatus (operational and administrative), bringing all three 
services (Army, Navy, Air Force) under the Secretary of Defense’s 
auspices.85 The law’s passage coincided with a massive and 
continual standing Army for the first time in American history, 
forever changing the allocation of power between Congress and the 
President.86  
The National Security Act also demoted the Secretaries of the 
Army and Navy from Cabinet officials to a military department 
head, and created the Air Force as a new military department—an 
outgrowth of the Army Air Corps.87 And in establishing a single 
Cabinet-level Secretary of Defense over all the services, it sought to 
solve a problem that persisted throughout World War II: inter-
service rivalry that undermined operational military 
effectiveness.88 During World War II, the uniformed heads of the 
Army and Navy possessed both administrative and operational 
authorities, but the services were often at loggerheads with one 
another.89 While ultimately successful in Allied victory, the Army 
and Navy failed to seamlessly conduct joint Navy and Army 
operations throughout the war.90 As President Truman declared, 
 
 83  Id. at § 201 (establishing the National Military Establishment as headed by the 
Secretary of Defense)  
 84  Id. at § 101–03 (setting forth the parameters of the creation of each institution listed).  
 85  See OMAR N. BRADLEY & CLAY BLAIR, A GENERAL'S LIFE 466 (1983) (explaining the office 
of Secretary of Defense and its control over all three Services). In 1949, two years later, the 
term “National Military Establishment” was changed to the Department of Defense. Id. 
 86  See DEP’T OF DEF., SELECTED MANPOWER STATISTICS: FISCAL YEAR 1997, supra note 81, 
at 51–53 (showing that the standing army consisted of approximately 1.5 million soldiers in 
1947 and that the standing army grew in the following decades).  
 87  For roles and responsibilities of the Secretary of the Air Force, see 10 U.S.C. § 8013 
(2012). 
 88  See FEICKERT, supra note 29, at 10 (explaining the problem of inter-service rivalries in 
World War II).  
 89  For example, Admiral Nimitz served as the head of the Navy in the Pacific Fleet in the 
Northern Pacific and General MacArthur served as head of the Army in the Southern Pacific.  
Joint, unified military operations were virtually non-existent in the Pacific theater. See id.  
 90  See id. (“Differences between the Army and Navy precluded any sort of unified command 
arrangement . . . .”). 
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“[w]e must never fight another war the way that we fought the last 
two. I have a feeling if the Army and Navy had fought our enemies 
as hard as they fought each other, the war would have ended much 
earlier.”91 
For this reason, the National Security Act placed the three 
military services under the direction, authority, and control of one 
civilian Secretary of Defense.92 A civilian served as the Secretary of 
each military department with a senior uniformed “service chief” 
reporting to each Secretary.93 The National Security Act also formed 
the early infrastructure for the modern military organization where 
civilian Secretaries of the military departments, in theory, provide 
the forces under the unified strategic direction of the combatant 
command.94  
Following the National Security Act’s passage, President 
Eisenhower sought to further increase the power of the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense and tightened civilian control of the military 
with follow-on reform efforts in 1953 and 1958.95 But despite 
Truman and Eisenhower’s efforts to reduce inter-service rivalry and 
improve defense acquisitions efficiency, the core problems of inter-
service rivalry remained unresolved.96  
 
 91  Id.  
 92  50 U.S.C. § 3002 (2012). 
 93  See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 5013 (2012) (explaining that the Secretary of the Navy is 
“appointed from civilian life”). 
 94  See 50 U.S.C. § 3002 (2012) (providing for the civilian Secretaries of Military 
Departments). For example, the Department of the Navy is defined as: 
[T]he Department of the Navy at the seat of government; the 
headquarters United States Marine Corps; the entire operating forces of 
the United States Navy, including naval aviation, and of the United 
States Marine Corps, including the reserve components of such forces; all 
field activities, headquarters, forces, bases, installations, activities and 
functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Navy; 
and the United States Coast Guard when operating as part of the Navy 
pursuant to law.  
50 U.S.C. § 3004 (2012). 
 95  See Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953, 18 F.R. 3743, 67 Stat. 638 (providing greater 
management flexibility to the Secretary of Defense); Department of Defense Reorganization 
Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-599, 63 Stat. 579 (authorizing the President, acting through the 
Secretary of Defense with the advice of the JCS, to establish unified or specified commands, 
assign missions, and determine their force structure).  
 96  See FEICKERT, supra note 29, at 5 (noting that there were numerous later instances of 
poor inter-service planning and cooperation which led to failed missions).  
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Indeed, this legal architecture remained in place throughout the 
Cold War and the Vietnam War.97 The civilian leadership and 
Secretary of Defense exercised considerable control over the 
military throughout the 1960s and the Vietnam War.98 Secretary of 
Defense Robert S. McNamara famously brought in data-driven 
“Whiz Kids” to the Pentagon.99 And President Johnson and 
McNamara were intimately involved in operational decision-
making throughout the Vietnam War.100 The CJCS did not regularly 
advise the President on military matters; he only met with the 
President twice before the introduction of ground troops in 
Vietnam.101 Commentators have argued that the absence of routine 
military advice led to military disaster.102 Indeed, it was not 
uncommon for President Johnson and Secretary McNamara to 
make targeting and tactical military decisions—such decisions 
were, historically, made by military commanders in the field.103  
Following the Vietnam War, the individual services were still 
king. They possessed enormous power and influence both in 
administrative and operational matters.104 Each service continued 
to exercise both operational and administrative control over their 
respective forces: Navy admirals continued to command ships, 
aircraft carriers and sailors, and Army generals commanded Army 
brigades, tank and infantry battalions and soldiers.105 Seldom did 
Navy admirals command Army soldiers and vice versa.106 Joint, 
 
 97  See id. at 4–5 (noting how the structure of the commands has changed since the mid-
1940s through the 1980s, covering the period of the Vietnam War and the Cold War).  
 98  See H.R. MCMASTER, DERELICTION OF DUTY 14 (1997) (discussing how the Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1958 “aimed to centralize control over the services, remove 
redundancies, streamline command channels, and provide for tighter civilian control at the 
Pentagon”).  
 99  Id. at 2.  
 100  Id. at 53–55. And they have been heavily criticized for their involvement. Id. at 54–55.  
 101  See id. at 217–42.  
 102  See Robert K. Brigham, Opinion, Lyndon Johnson vs. the Hawks, N. Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/29/opinion/lyndon-johnson-vietnam-senate.html.  
 103  But not entirely, President Lincoln, for example, was intimately involved in military 
tactical decision-making during the Civil War. For a discussion of this civil-military dynamic, 
see generally id.  
 104  See FEICKERT, supra note 29, at 4–5 (stating that from the National Security Act of 1947 
until the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986, commanders of each service 
were delegated full operational control over their forces).  
 105  Id.  
 106  See id. (noting that once forces were assigned to certain commanders, control of those 
forces could only be transferred with Presidential approval).  
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multi-service warfare was simply not a reality between 1947 and 
1986, harming operational military effectiveness. Each military 
service, in effect, was still “king” in joint, unified warfare. The 
combatant commands’ operational authorities and the efficacious 
joint warfare had to wait until the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 to 
be fully realized.107  
III. THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT OF 1986 ACCELERATES THE 
OPERATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE MILITARY DIVIDE 
A casual observer may chalk up today’s relative lack of civilian 
oversight over the operational military to an underlying tactical and 
technological problem: the military needs to be poised for a swift 
response in the face of fast-paced and complex threats facing the 
nation (cyber, transnational terrorism, etc.). That is not irrelevant, 
but there is more to it. The statutory regime adopted in 1986 which 
attempted to improve military operational effectiveness and to 
reduce inter-service rivalry, created a structure that further 
isolated the operational military from oversight.  
The concepts of command and control are of central importance 
for the military and define how the DoD allocates power within the 
agency. Under joint military doctrine, “command” is defined as 
“[t]he authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully 
exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.”108 
Command is “the most important role undertaken by a [joint force 
commander]”109 and includes “[a]n order given by a commander; 
that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of 
bringing about a particular action.”110 Control is a lesser authority. 
 
 107  In his last years in office, President Eisenhower sought to build upon the National 
Security Act reforms. He somewhat succeeded. The DoD Reorganization Act of 1958 
established a clear line of command from the President through the Secretary of Defense to 
the combatant commands. See FEICKERT, supra note 29, at 5. 
 108  JOINT PUBLICATION 1, supra note 56, at GL-5. Under military doctrine, command and 
control is “[t]he exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over 
assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.” Id.  
 109  Id. at xxii; see FEAVER, supra note 50, at 82–83 (noting that Congress may have “viewed 
the newly strengthened Joint Staff as creating yet another fire alarm”). “[U]nity of command” 
is defined as “[t]he operation of all forces under a single responsible commander who has the 
requisite authority to direct and employ those forces in pursuit of a common purpose.” DOD 
DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 252. 
 110  DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 40. 
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It includes “[a]uthority that may be less than full command 
exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate 
or other organizations.”111  
In the traditional employer-employee context at other federal 
agencies, command and control have far different meanings. Most 
agency and civil service employees serve within that particular 
agency’s human resource rules and can be hired, fired, and 
disciplined accordingly. In contrast, the DoD is governed by a vast 
hierarchical structure that exerts a more coercive effect on its 
members: failing to obey a military supervisor’s order could result 
in criminal prosecution.112 There is simply no corollary in the 
civilian world or at other federal agencies.  
This Part describes and analyzes the Goldwater-Nichols Act, 
focusing on its modification of command and control authorities. In 
the terminology of Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn, Goldwater-
Nichols possesses certain “super-statute” qualities within the halls 
of the Pentagon.113 Although it has yet to achieve similar super-
statute appreciation outside the DoD, its effect on the DoD and its 
implications for civilian control of the military are enormous—
further underscoring why Goldwater-Nichols merits the status as a 
“super-statute.”  
A. THE LAW OF THE CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE RISE OF THE 
OPERATIONAL MILITARY AND THE (RELATIVE) FALL OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE MILITARY114 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act was born from the ashes of military 
operational failures.115 In addition to the tragedy of the Vietnam 
War, the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt contributed to 
 
 111  JOINT PUBLICATION 1, supra note 56, at GL-6. 
 112  See 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2012) (stating that “failure to obey order or regulation” is a 
punishable offense). 
   113  See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216 
(2001) (noting that a super-statute tries to create a new institutional framework that impacts 
the public culture and has an extensive effect on the law).  
 114  “Relative” is placed in parenthesis on purpose—the administrative military yields 
enormous power in the acquisitions process and the development of equipment and weaponry. 
See infra Part IV.D (arguing that the dual-military creates issues in the administrative 
military’s ability to equip the operational military).  
 115  See KATHLEEN MCINNIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44474, GOLDWATER-NICHOLS AT 30: 
DEFENSE REFORM AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3 (2016) (describing the military history and 
failures leading up to the passage of the Act). 
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President Carter’s electoral defeat to President Reagan in 1980.116 
It also exposed the DoD’s inability to conduct joint, inter-service 
military operations.117 Inter-service rivalry was not just a 
bureaucratic fight over funding, status, and influence—it was 
costing American lives.118  
The Goldwater-Nichols Act sought to address all of these 
concerns by reducing inter-service rivalry and streamlining civilian 
authority within the Department.119 Like a weary parent tired of 
sibling rivalry and bickering, Congress finally stepped in to make 
the services get along and work together.120   
After years of debate and significant pushback from the 
Pentagon, Congress passed the bipartisan Goldwater-Nichols Act in 
1986, named after Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), a World War II 
veteran and 1964 Republican Presidential nominee and 
Representative Mike Nichols (D-AL), another highly decorated 
veteran.121 Passed in the shadow of earlier operational military 
failures, supporters of the Act hoped to strengthen civilian control 
over the military, improve military operational effectiveness, 
streamline the costly and lengthy acquisitions process, and lessen 
inter-service rivalry through a focus on joint warfare and 
doctrine.122 Specifically, Goldwater-Nichols was intended to:  
[S]trengthen civilian authority in the Department . . . 
improve the military advice provided to the President, 
the National Security Council, and the Secretary of 
 
 116  See JAMES LOCHNER, VICTORY ON THE POTOMAC 30–31 (Joseph G. Dawson III et al. eds., 
2002) (describing the fall of President Carter and the election of President Regan).  
 117  See MCINNIS, supra note 115, at 3 (describing the effects of the hostage rescue).  
 118  See id. (showing that the lack of cohesiveness led to failed missions and casualties).  
 119  See id. at 6–8 (stating the aims of the Act).  
 120  See id. (noting the Act’s goal to encourage cohesiveness between the Military 
Departments).  
 121  See LOCHNER, supra note 116, at 96, 211, 217, 420–28 (offering an overview of the 
legislative history on the Goldwater-Nichols Act’s passage). Senator Goldwater served as a 
Major General in the U.S. Air Force Reserves until his retirement from service. Id. at 213. 
 122  See MCINNIS, supra note 115, at 7–8 (discussing the purposes of the passage of the Act). 
In a staff report to the Senate Armed Services Committee, four key "indicators of 
organizational deficiencies” for the period preceding Goldwater-Nichols were meticulously 
catalogued. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ARMED SERVS., 99TH CONG., DEFENSE ORGANIZATION: THE 
NEED FOR CHANGE 15 (Comm. Print 1985). The four indicators include: (1) operational 
failures and deficiencies; (2) acquisition process deficiencies; (3) lack of strategic direction; 
and (4) poor inter-Service coordination. Id. 
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Defense . . . [and] place clear responsibility on the 
commanders of the unified and specified combatant 
commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned 
to those commands.123 
Yet Senator Goldwater’s own views at the outset of the hearing 
to reform the DoD called into question the continuing importance of 
civilian control of the American military: 
 
The question is, can we, as a country, any longer afford 
a 207-year old concept that in military matters the 
civilian is supreme? . . . Now, I realize the sanctity of 
the idea of the civilian being supreme. It is a beautiful 
thing to think about. The question in my mind is, can 
we any longer afford to allow the expertise of [military] 
men and women . . . to be set aside for the decisions of 
the civilians . . . . We lost in Korea, no question about 
that, because we did not let the military leadership 
exercise military judgment. We lost in Vietnam . . . . If 
that is the way we are going to do it in the future, I think 
we are in trouble.124 
The Act accomplished three main objectives, which had the effect of 
empowering the operational military at the expense of the 
administrative military.  
First, it established two chains of command within the military, 
effectively dividing it in two.125 In doing so, Goldwater-Nichols 
addressed how the President commands by modifying the DoD’s 
operational chain of command to flow from each combatant 
commander to the Secretary of Defense to the President.126 It also 
established a parallel administrative chain of command that flows 
from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of 
 
 123  Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control 
of the U.S. Military, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 351 (1994) (quoting Goldwater-Nichols 
Act, Pub. L. No. 99-433 §3 100 Stat. 992-93 (1986)); see 10 U.S.C. § 162 (a) (2012) (“[T]he 
Secretaries of the military departments shall assign all forces under their jurisdiction to . . . 
combatant commands . . . to perform missions assigned to those commands.”). 
 124  Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 98th Cong. 3 (1983) (statement of Sen. 
Goldwater, Member, S. Comm. on Armed Servs.). 
 125  See 10 U.S.C. § 162(b) (2012) (describing the split in the chain of command).  
 126  Id. (describing the operational chain of command).  
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each military department.127 Under Goldwater-Nichols, the civilian 
heads of each military department possess authority and 
responsibility over twelve administrative functions.128  
Second, Goldwater-Nichols elevated the powers of the combatant 
commanders, eliminating the civilian Secretaries of the military 
departments and the uniformed service chiefs from any operational 
or war-fighting function, which greatly diminished their overall 
authority.129 The civilian Secretaries of the military departments 
are now completely outside the operational (war-fighting) chain of 
command and must support the combatant commander by 
providing all forces to the operational military: “[T]he Secretaries of 
the Military Departments shall assign all forces under their 
jurisdiction to . . . combatant commands . . . to perform missions 
assigned to those commands.”130 
The administrative military departments do not truly command 
any forces, although they provide a level of administrative control 
consistent with their twelve statutory functions.131 In contrast, the 
operational military both commands and controls.132 And under 
Goldwater-Nichols, the senior uniformed combatant commanders 
are “responsible to the President and to the Secretary of Defense for 
the performance of missions assigned to that command by the 
President or by the Secretary with the approval of the President.”133 
The combatant commanders are invested with broad authority to 
plan and execute the nation’s wars.134 Their roles and 
 
 127  See id. (describing an administrative chain of command involving the Military 
Department Secretaries).  
 128  These twelve functions include: “(1) recruiting; (2) organizing, (3) supplying, (4) 
equipping (includes research and development), (5) training, (6) servicing, (7) mobilizing, (8) 
demobilizing, (9) administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel), (10) 
maintaining, (11) the construction, outfitting and repair of military equipment, and (12) the 
construction, maintenance, and repair of building, structures and utilities and the acquisition 
of real property and interests in real property necessary to carry out the responsibilities 
specified in this section.” 10 U.S.C. § 5013 (b) (2012).   
 129  See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 162 (2012) (altering the power and roles of several operational 
military actors). 
 130  10 U.S.C. § 162(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 131  See 10 U.S.C. § 5013(b) (outlining the twelve statutory functions of the administrative 
military department).  
 132  See 10 U.S.C. § 164 (2012) (describing the authority of the operational military).  
 133  10 U.S.C. § 164 (2012). 
 134  See Reveron & Gavin, supra note 4, at 1–2.  
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responsibilities have expanded over the years to encompass a large 
swath of non-military and foreign relations functions.135 
Third, Goldwater-Nichols empowered the Office of the CJCS, 
boosting its stature, responsibility, and authority.136 Under 
Goldwater-Nichols, the CJCS enjoys enormous authority and 
influence due to the centralization of military advice to the 
President and the way that orders are promulgated and 
communicated.137 This change coincided with General Colin 
Powell’s service as the first post-Goldwater-Nichols Chairman.138 
General Powell, a former White House Fellow and one of the first 
African-American four-star generals, was a particularly influential 
military officer who orchestrated the U.S. military operation in the 
Persian Gulf War.139 Both Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill 
Clinton revered General Powell’s advice.140 His remarkable political 
and military skills greatly bolstered the power of the Chairman’s 
office.141  
Communications from the operational military combatant 
commands are now transmitted via the Chairman, completely 
bypassing the civilian service Secretaries.142 The CJCS translates 
and communicates direction and operational orders up and down 
the chain of command.143 These are sent to the combatant 
commands and their associated operational military commanders; 
many of whom are engaged in major combat operations.144 All 
operational orders originate from the Joint Staff, circumventing the 
 
 135  See id. (describing the enlarged role of combatant commanders). 
 136  10 U.S.C. § 163(a)(1) (2012).  
 137  Id.  
 138  See Colin Powell Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM (Apr. 2, 2014), 
https://www.biography.com/peopl/colin-powell-9445708 (“In 1989, President George H.W. 
Bush appointed General Colin Powell as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”).  
 139  See id.  
 140  See id.   
 141  See id.  
 142  See 10 U.S.C. § 163(a)(1) (2012) (outlining how communications from combatant 
commands are transmitted). And the Joint Staff’s size and stature within DoD has grown 
significantly in recent years. See LOCHNER, supra note 116, at 213.  
 143  See 10 U.S.C. § 163 (2012) (outlining the chain of communication for operational orders).  
 144  Id.  
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individual service leaders.145 The Chairman and his highly qualified 
staff now implement Presidential policy and direction.146  
Relatedly, Goldwater-Nichols established the Chairman as the 
principal military advisor to the President, Secretary of Defense, 
National Security Council, and Homeland Security Council.147 This 
change serves to unify and channel the military advice provided to 
civilian decision makers—it comes from one person (rather than in 
a diffuse nature through the individual service chiefs). By law, the 
Chairman has direct access to the President in providing military 
advice and does not need to formally coordinate this advice via the 
Secretary of Defense.148  
Finally, combatant commands have broad delegated legal 
authority to create new organizations and commands, so-called 
“Joint Task Forces,” in response to an emergency, humanitarian 
mission, or any other military missions.149 This takes place wholly 
independent of congressional oversight.150 These Joint Task Forces 
are of increased importance for ongoing military operations—such 
as those in Syria and Afghanistan—with the combatant commands 
taking on more of an oversight role.151 For example, General Miller 
leads the U.S. task force that is part of the NATO Resolute Support 
Mission in Afghanistan.152 He reports to the Central Commander, 
currently General Votel.153 
 
 145  Id.  
 146  Failure to comply with a lawful order is a firing offense and risks courts-martial. See 
Sarah Grant & Jack Goldsmith, What if President Trump Orders Secretary of Defense Mattis 
to do Something Deeply Unwise?, LAWFARE (Aug. 22, 2017, 12:36 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-if-president-trump-orders-secretary-defense-mattis-do-
something-deeply-unwise.  
 147  10 U.S.C. § 151(b) (2012). 
 148  10 U.S.C. § 162(b) (2012).  
 149  See JOINT PUBLICATION 1, supra note 56, at xviii (noting how and under what authority 
Joint Task Forces can be created).  
 150  Id. at IV-10–IV-12 (discussing the high level of discretion that the operational military 
has in creating Joint Task Forces).  
 151  Geography plays a role in the allocation of power and authority between combatant 
commands and the administrative military. Most geographic combatant commanders are 
outside the United States, creating additional time-distance problems, further hindering 
oversight. Cf id. (exploring the effects of geography on military oversight).  
 152  Jim Garamone, Miller Takes Over NATO, U.S. Command in Afghanistan, U.S. DEP’T 
DEF. (Sept. 2, 2018), https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1618550/miller-takes-over-
nato-us-commands-in-afghanistan/. 
 153  General Joseph L. Votel, U.S. DEP’T DEF. (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.defense.gov/
About/Biographies/Biography-View/article/602777/general-joseph-l-votel/.  
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In sum, due to Goldwater-Nichols, the operational combatant 
commanders’ authorities grew significantly. So, too, did the status 
and power of the CJCS. The operational military commands now 
have broad responsibility to plan for the employment of armed 
forces, respond to military contingencies, and take actions to deter 
conflict and command the military.154 The administrative military 
now supports the operational military, which possesses the legal 
and doctrinal authority to utilize all the breathtaking tools of 
modern warfare.155  
A snapshot of the evolution of the military’s chain of command is 
provided in Table 1, below. Two key points demand highlighting. 
First, the President and Secretary of Defense (both civilians) are in 
the lawful chain of command for both militaries.156  Second, under 
Goldwater-Nichols, there are three levels of civilian oversight 
(President, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of Army, Navy, or 
Air Force) within the administrative military’s chain of command, 
but only two levels of civilian oversight (President and Secretary of 
Defense) within the operational military’s chain of command.157 The 
CJCS has direct access to the President for all military advice—this 
advice has historically focused on operational military matters.158 
The positions in italics indicate active-duty military personnel. 
 
Table 1: The Law of the Chain of Command Through History 
  1789-1947 1947-1986 1986-present 
 
 
 
Operational 
Military 
President159 
 
Secretary of 
War 
 
Secretary of 
Army; 
President 
 
Secretary of 
Defense 
 
President 
 
Secretary of 
Defense 
 
 
 154  10 U.S.C. § 164 (b)(3)(A)–(C) (2012) (listing the primary duties of a Commander of a 
combatant command). 
 155  See supra Parts II.B–C, III (discussing how the operational military and administrative 
military interact with each other). 
 156  10 U.S.C. § 162(b) (2012) (“Unless otherwise directed by the President, the chain of 
command to a unified or specified combatant runs from the President to the Secretary of 
Defense.”). 
 157  10 U.S.C. §§ 162(b), 164(c). 
 158  10 U.S.C. § 151. 
 159  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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Secretary of 
Navy 
 
Senior Military 
Officer in Army 
or Navy 
Combatant 
Commanders160 
 
Combatant 
Commanders161 
(via Chairman, 
Joint Staff) 
 
 
 
Administrative 
Military 
Effectively 
Mirrors 
Operational 
Military Chain 
of Command 
President 
 
Secretary of 
Defense 
 
Civilian 
Secretaries of 
Military 
Departments 
 
Uniformed 
“Chiefs”162 
President 
 
Secretary of 
Defense 
 
Civilian 
Secretaries of 
Military 
Departments163 
 
Uniformed 
“Chiefs”164 
B. HOW THE LAW OF MILITARY “CONTROL” AND THE RISE OF JOINT 
MILITARY DOCTRINE FURTHER DIVIDE THE TWO MILITARIES  
In addition to altering the chain of command, Goldwater-Nichols 
fundamentally changed the way the two militaries controlled their 
forces. Control, a military authority that is “less than full 
command,” defines the way the military conducts its day-to-day 
activities.165 Under joint military doctrine, three of the four 
command authorities pertain to the operational military 
 
 160  The forces (people, weapons, and equipment) are administratively assigned to 
individual services that continue to exercise operational control over them. Cf 10 U.S.C 
§164(c) (outlining the command authority of Combatant Commanders).  
 161  Forces are now assigned to combatant commands from the individual services. 10 U.S.C. 
§ 162(a)(1) (2012). The heads of each service are not in the operational chain of command. See 
generally id. at §162(b) (not specifically including the heads of each service in the operational 
chain of command).  
 162  Prior to Goldwater-Nichols, the senior military officer in each branch of service (Army, 
Navy, Air Force, Marines) exercised operational control over their individual service forces. 
See discussion supra Part III.A (noting the changes that occurred after Goldwater-Nichols).  
 163  Following Goldwater-Nichols, the military services assigned all forces under their 
jurisdiction (with limited exception) to the combatant commands. 10 U.S.C. § 162 (a) (2012). 
 164  See id.  
 165  DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 49–50. 
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(combatant command, operational, and tactical).166 Just one 
authority—administrative control—pertains to the administrative 
military.167 
As a result, the operational military has two significant lines of 
control emanating from its forces: Personnel assigned to the 
combatant commands have both an operational chain of command 
for war-fighting and military operations that leads to the combatant 
commander, as well as an administrative chain of command for 
administrative matters that leads to the Secretaries of the military 
departments.168 In contrast, the administrative military has just 
one—administrative control.169 
Goldwater-Nichols also increased the role and stature of joint 
military doctrine, defined as “overarching guidance and 
fundamental principles for the employment of the Armed Forces of 
the United States.”170 It serves as the “bridge between policy and 
doctrine and describes the authorized command relationships and 
authority that military commanders can use and other operational 
matters derived from [law].”171 Military doctrine is properly viewed 
as the military’s day-to-day implementation guidance that is nested 
within existing statute; it acts as a sort of sub-regulation, at times 
with the force of law.172 If the military came with a user manual, 
 
 166  In the control context, the confusingly named “combatant command” is also a control 
authority. See id. at 37 (defining “combatant command”); see also id. at 175, 234 (defining 
“operational control” and “tactical control” which place both within the operational military). 
 167 Administrative control is inextricably linked to the statutory authority and 
responsibility provided to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. 
§ 5013 (2012) (defining the Secretary of the Navy’s role and responsibilities). 
 168  10 U.S.C. § 165(b) (2012) (“The Secretary of the Military Department is responsible for 
the administration and support of forces assigned by him to a combatant command.”).  
 169  10 U.S.C. § 165(a) (2012) (stating that the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of the Military Department are responsible for 
administrative control over combatant commands).  
 170  JOINT PUBLICATION 1, supra note 56, at ix. “[I]t specifies the authorized command 
relationships and authority that military commanders can use, provides guidance for the 
exercise of that military authority, provides fundamental principles and guidance for 
command and control, prescribes guidance for organizing and developing joint forces, and 
describes policy for selected joint activities. It also provides the doctrinal basis for interagency 
coordination and for US military involvement in multiagency and multinational operations.” 
Id. at i (emphasis added).  
 171  Id. at ix. 
 172  See DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 2 (“Joint doctrine enhances the operational 
effectiveness of the Armed Forces by providing authoritative guidance and standardized 
terminology on topics relevant to the employment of military forces . . . . .”).  
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this would be it. The CJCS issues joint doctrine, which takes 
precedence over all other doctrine to include service-specific 
doctrine—yet another indication of the operational military’s 
importance.173  
Within joint doctrine, combatant command authority is the 
pinnacle of military control authority, and this term can be found in 
both statute and doctrine.174 Its doctrinal definition mirrors its 
statutory definition to include full authority for a: “combatant 
commander to perform those functions of command over assigned 
forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces; 
assigning tasks; designating objectives; and giving authoritative 
direction over all aspects of military operations.”175 
“Operational control” and “tactical control,” the other two 
command authorities the operational military possesses, perform 
certain “stacking doll” functions that are embedded and inherent 
within combatant command authority.176 Both are of significant 
importance to the execution of military operations and can be traced 
to the earliest interpretations of the Commander in Chief 
authority.177 Operational control is defined as: 
 
the authority to perform those functions of command 
over subordinate forces involving organizing and 
employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, 
designating objectives, and giving authoritative 
direction over all aspects of military operations and 
joint training necessary to accomplish the mission. . . it 
does not . . . include authoritative direction for logistics 
or matters of administration, discipline, internal 
organization or unit training.178 
 
 
 173  JOINT PUBLICATION 1, supra note 56, at VI-3.  
 174  See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 164(c) (2012) (discussing combat command with respect to several 
areas).  
 175  DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 37 (emphasis added).  
 176  See discussion supra Part II (discussing tactical and operational control). 
 177  See, e.g., Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 615 (1850) (noting that the Commander in Chief 
has the power to employ the military placed by law at his command and direct their 
movements). 
 178  JOINT PUBLICATION 1, supra note 56, at GL-10.  
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Similarly, tactical control is inherent in both combatant command 
and operational control. It is defined as “[authority] . . . that is 
limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or 
maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish 
missions or tasked assigned.”179 
Contrast these three control authorities of the operational 
military with the single control authority—administrative control—
that the administrative military possesses by virtue of the 
administrative chain of command. Administrative control is closely 
linked to the statutory authority placed in the civilian military 
service secretaries, and defined as: 
 
Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or 
other organizations in respect to administration and 
support, including organization of Service forces, 
control of resources and equipment, personnel 
management, logistics, individual and unit training, 
readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and 
other matters not included in the operational missions 
of the subordinate or other organizations.180  
 
To highlight this division and the importance of control, consider 
the hypothetical of a Navy aircraft carrier with 5,000 military 
service members assigned to European Command. The European 
operational commander has broad authority to position the aircraft 
carrier throughout an enormous Area of Responsibility from the 
Arctic Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea in response to a crisis, or 
however he or she sees fit. The administrative military with its 
separate chain of command, by contrast, exercises more limited 
control over the sailors onboard the aircraft carrier for training, 
personnel management, health care, and other ministerial matters. 
Table 2 presents a snapshot of the law of control for both the 
operational and administrative militaries. 
 
 
 
   179  Id. at GL-11–GL-12.  
 180  Id. at V-12 (as amended through Mar. 2013). Four of the statutory functions are 
explicitly found in doctrine, to include equipping, training, mobilizing, and servicing. Other 
functions are found implicitly (e.g. administering, logistics). Id.  
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Table 2: The Hierarchy of Military Control 
Operational Military Administrative Military 
Combatant Command 
 
Authority 
 
Operational Control 
 
Tactical Control 
Administrative Control 
  
Individual Service Control 
 
In sum, Goldwater-Nichols increased the operational 
effectiveness of the military, streamlined the chain of command, 
and generated a revolution in joint warfare.181 But it overshot in the 
achievement of its goals and resulted in a weakening of civilian 
control over the military through a modification of the chain of 
command and a diminished role for the civilian Secretaries of the 
military departments. Indeed, under Goldwater-Nichols there is 
now just one civilian between the operational combatant 
commanders charged with war fighting and the President.182 And 
the senior uniformed military officer, the CJCS, has direct access to 
the President as the principal military advisor.183  
Today we have a standing army at a size unimaginable to the 
founders and a vast, complex dual-military organization 
continuously funded by a captured Congress.184 The operational 
military now possesses a vast footprint throughout the world, 
consistently funded by Congress, re-affirming its own existence.185 
Inertia emerges whereby Congress cannot defund the massive 
military without facing enormous political risk. After all, members 
 
 181  See supra Part III (discussing how the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act allowed for 
operational and administrative efficiency).  
 182  See 50 U.S.C. § 3002 (2012) (placing the three Military Services under the direction, 
authority, and control of one civilian Secretary of Defense). Former Secretary of Defense, 
James Mattis, was head of the most powerful combatant commander (Central Command) just 
four years prior to being appointed Secretary of Defense. Biography of Secretary of Defense 
James N. Mattis, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., https://www.defense.gov/About/Biographies/Biography-
View/Article/1055835/james-mattis/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2019).  
 183  10 U.S.C. § 151(b) (2012). 
 184  See DEP’T OF DEF., STRENGTH COMPARISON (DECEMBER 2018) 
https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp (recording that there are over 1.3 
million persons in the Armed Forces as of December, 31, 2018).  
 185  See FEICKERT, supra note 29, at 1–3.  
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of Congress do not want to be accused of being “against the troops” 
through the denial of funding to military members overseas.186  
Finally, the DoD is best understood as an extraterritorial federal 
agency. Pursuant to Goldwater-Nichols, geographic combatant 
commanders, their large staffs, and subordinate commands are 
permanently stationed overseas. There is not one domestic-based 
military that responds to crisis abroad on a case-by-case basis.187 
There are two militaries, and the operational military’s pre-existing 
force structure already covers the entire globe in war, peace, and 
everywhere in between. The continuation of the combatant 
commander infrastructure facilitates a certain “systematic, 
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of 
Congress and never before questioned.”188  This only empowers the 
President, who can point to continued congressional acquiescence 
and its continual funding of combatant commanders as “a gloss on 
‘executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”189  
IV. THE OPERATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE MILITARY DIVIDE’S 
FOUR CONSEQUENCES 
The two-military divide has several consequences, further 
accelerated by independent factors. I focus on four of these 
consequences including: (1) diminished civilian control of the 
operational military, (2) militarization of foreign policy, (3) unclear 
application of administrative law to the operational military, and 
(4) continual bureaucratic tension between the two militaries.  
As Goldwater-Nichols established two militaries with two sets of 
authorities and two chains of command, congressional oversight 
over the operational military has lagged.190 Congress often remains 
engaged with administrative military matters, particularly defense 
 
 186  See R. Jeffrey Smith, Will Cutting the Defense Budget Leave America at Risk?, THE 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 26, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/01/will-cutting-
the-defense-budget-leave-america-at-risk/252010/ (discussing how debates over military 
spending raise fear in Americans, which are hard for politicians to navigate). 
 187  Cf DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 37 (defining the broad authority of control given 
to combatant commanders, allowing them to respond to each perceived crisis as each sees fit). 
 188  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
 189  Id. at 611.  
 190  See, e.g., Searcey & Schmitt, supra note 42, at A5 (reporting that senators are unaware 
of all of the United States’ military activities around the world).   
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acquisitions that can have significant impacts on employers in a 
member’s home district.191 By contrast, fundamental questions 
about the scope and legality of operational military operations go 
unanswered.  
To highlight one example, Congress passed the last two 
congressional Authorizations for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) 
in  2001 and 2002, and each fails to include an AUMF sunset 
provision or updated authorization language restricting 
operations.192 In the absence of any restrictions, the operational 
military continues to fill the void left behind by congressional 
leadership.193 Indeed, the U.S. military is operating in an increasing 
number of countries throughout the world, conducting an ever-
expanding menu of missions without the requisite amount of 
oversight.194 The discussion below articulates how the 
administrative military’s functions are increasingly aligned with 
congressional interests. Congress, in turn, places too much 
attention on the administrative military and not enough attention 
on the operational military. Further, while administrative law and 
the APA apply to the bulk of the administrative military’s actions, 
it remains unclear how, precisely, it applies to the operational 
military (if at all).195 This Part begins by first addressing the concept 
of “civilian control of the military” and the health of this important 
constitutional norm in light of the divide.  
 
 191  See James Fallows, The Tragedy of the American Military, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/01/the-tragedy-of-the-american-
military/383516/ (“Many on Capitol Hill see the Pentagon with admirable simplicity . . . [i]t 
is a way of directing tax money to selected districts.”). 
 192  See generally Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, 
H.R.J. Res. 114, 107th Cong. (Oct. 16, 2002); Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 
23, 107th Cong. (Sept. 18, 2001). 
 193  See FEICKERT supra note 29, at 14 (noting that combatant commanders can create a 
Joint Task Force for a variety of reasons and that those Joint Task Forces are not disbanded 
until their mission is deemed accomplished by the combatant commander).  
 194  See, e.g., Turse, supra note 41 (noting that Special Operations forces have grown in 
every possible way from their budget to their pace of operations to the geographic sweep of 
their missions since September 11, 2001). 
 195  See Kathryn E. Kovacs, Leveling the Deference Playing Field, 90 OR. L. REV. 583, 585 
(2012) (noting that Congress made the deliberate decision to subject the military to review 
under the APA but not explaining how this review would affect the military’s operational 
activities).  
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A. THE TWO-MILITARY DIVIDE’S FIRST LEGACY: CENTRALIZATION AND 
DIMINISHED CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE OPERATIONAL MILITARY 
1. Defining Civilian Control of the Military. 
In political theory, “civilian control of the military” places 
ultimate responsibility for a country’s strategic decision-making in 
the hands of civilian political leadership, not professional military 
officers.196 Samuel Huntington, the preeminent political theorist of 
civil-military affairs, summarized civilian control as the “proper 
subordination of autonomous profession to the ends of policy.”197 
Civilian control of the military is better understood not as a 
dichotomy but as a continual process whose strength ebbs and flows 
over time due to a variety of factors.198 It fluctuates with political 
norms, institutions, and personalities. That continuum can range 
from “the extreme of countries ruled by military establishments, or 
that experience periodic coups d’etat and frequent direct or indirect 
military intervention in politics, to those that do not even possess 
standing military forces.”199   
The United States has a remarkably strong history of civilian 
control of the military since the nation’s inception. This can be 
traced to the earliest days of the Republic and George Washington’s 
willingness to cede power to the Continental Congress upon his 
defeat of the British Army.200 But America’s strong tradition of 
civilian control is not a foregone conclusion. It requires constant 
 
 196  See FEAVER, supra note 50, at 80–81 (discussing the role of civilian principals as a 
“screening mechanism” on military actions.  
 197  SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND POLITICS OF 
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 72 (1959). Huntington also noted that despite numerous historical 
references, a satisfactory definition of “civilian control of the military” had yet to emerge. He 
divided the concept into two modes of control: subjective and objective. Subjective civilian 
control maximizes “the power of civilian groups in relation to the military” via civilian 
institutions and constitutional norms. Objective civilian control “professionalizes” the 
military by consigning the armed forces exclusively to the apolitical task of the management 
of violence. Id. at 80–85.  
 198  See Richard H. Kohn, An Essay on Civilian Control of the Military, AMERICAN 
DIPLOMACY (Mar. 1997) http://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/1997/03/an-essay-on-civilian-
control-of-the-military/ (“The truth of the matter is that fundamentally, civilian control is not 
a fact but a process.”). 
 199  Id.  
 200  See JOSEPH ELLIS, HIS EXCELLENCY: GEORGE WASHINGTON 145–46 (2004) (quoting 
George Washington at the official ceremony celebrating victory as saying, “[h]aving now 
finished the work assigned me . . . I retire from the great theatre of Action . . . . I here offer 
my Commission, and take my leave of all the enjoyments of public life”). 
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evaluation, to include weighing the relative influence “the military 
and civilians have in the decisions of state concerning war, internal 
security, external defense, and military affairs.”201  
Within political theory, military accountability to the legislative 
branch is essential to the healthy maintenance of civilian control 
over the military.202 Accountability to the legislative branch, in 
turn, helps ensure accountability to the civilian populace.203 This 
fosters public discussion, debate, transparency in military affairs, 
clarity on military expenditures, and investigation and inquiry into 
military matters.204 This authority must be actively exercised, 
however, lest it lie fallow, undermining civilian control.205 Strong 
legislative oversight over the military actually “strengthens 
national defense by reinforcing military identification with the 
people and popular identification with the military.”206  
Congress disproportionately exercises its authority and control 
over the administrative military at the expense of operational 
military oversight.207 Further, once Congress delegates power and 
statutory authority to the operational military, it is difficult to get 
back.208 Inertia sets in. Consider the Special Operations Command 
(SOCOM), which is still the only military command formally 
established by Congress by statute (pursuant to an amendment to 
the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1987).209 Or consider Africa 
Command, the nation’s newest geographic combatant command, 
 
 201  Kohn, supra note 198 (positing that the foundations of democratic civilian control of the 
military rests on four requirements: (1) democratic governance and rule of law; (2) 
accountability to public institutions; (3) effective countervailing power; and (4) a military 
tradition committed to neutrality). 
 202  See id.  
 203  See id. (“Accountability to parliament or to the legislature implies accountability to the 
populace.”). 
 204  See id.   
 205  See id. (“[W]here civilian control is weak or nonexistent, military influence laps over 
into other areas of public policy and social life.”). 
 206  Id.  
 207  See discussion infra Part IV.A.3. (arguing that Congress actively regulates the activities 
of the administrative military but not those of the operational military).  
 208  See, e.g., Brian McKeon & Caroline Tess, How Congress Can Take Back Foreign Policy: 
A Playbook for Capitol Hill, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Jan./Feb. 2019) 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-11-07/how-congress-can-take-
back-foreign-policy (noting both that Congress has more authority over foreign affairs than 
they are utilizing and that the ability to take it back, has been “eroded by a variety of factors”).  
 209  See 10 U.S.C. § 167 (2012) (establishing SOCOM).  
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established in 2007.210 Since its inception, its size, scale, and 
influence have grown significantly, and its headquarters staff now 
exceeds European Command’s.211  Once created, bureaucracies fight 
for status, funding, and influence, consistent with normal 
bureaucratic behavior—the military bureaucracy and its combatant 
commands are no different.212  
Finally, the judiciary also has an important role in the 
maintenance of civilian control of the military. Within 
administrative law and § 706 of the APA, citizens can bring 
individual citizen suits against agencies for violating the “arbitrary 
and capricious” standard.213 But the APA has an uneven application 
to the two-military divide: as discussed in greater detail below, the 
administrative military is largely subject to such suits based upon 
the definition of “agency,” while it remains unclear how the APA 
applies to operational military actions. 214 
 
2. Goldwater-Nichols’ Emphasis on Centralization 
Goldwater-Nichols furthered the centralization of the 
operational military’s power to include the streamlining of military 
advice via one person: the CJCS. The CJCS now has a pivotal role 
as the single voice and provider of legal advice to the President, 
Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council.215 In the 
operational military context, the uniformed members of the Joint 
Staff are incentivized to reach a certain baseline level of consensus 
in their advice to the CJCS as they lack a legal mechanism to 
 
 210  See U.S. AFRICOM Pub. Affs., U.S. Africa Command Reaches Initial Operating 
Capability, UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND (Oct. 1, 2007), https://www.africom.mil/media-
room/Article/6042/us-africa-command-reaches-initial-operating-capabi (detailing the 
creation of Africa Command).  
 211  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-652R: DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS: 
GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDS RELY ON SUBORDINATE COMMANDS FOR MISSION 
MANAGEMENT AND EXECUTION 16–17 (2016) (stating that Africa Command’s headquarters 
includes 1,734 persons while European Command’s headquarters includes 1,535 persons). 
 212  See generally JAMES Q. WILSON, ON BUREAUCRACY:  WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO 
AND WHY THEY DO IT (1989); see also WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 71–72 (1971) (suggesting that military strategy has been 
driven by budget considerations).  
 213  5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).  
 214  See discussion infra Part IV.C.1.  
 215  10 U.S.C. §§ 151 (2012). 
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directly advise the President and Secretary of Defense.216 As 
Goldwater-Nichols discourages inter-service rivalry, the role and 
importance of dissent was minimized.217 Under this centralized 
model, the President and civilian decision-makers receive one voice 
from the entire military on operational military matters despite an 
increasingly complex menu of national security issues.218 Each 
service provides their senior military officer to sit on the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, but any dissent is filtered through the CJCS.219  
Goldwater-Nichols also established a personnel incentive 
structure where joint assignments within operational military 
commands such as the Joint Staff and combatant commands are 
highly sought-after and a legal prerequisite for promotion to flag 
and general officer.220 Career-minded officers are competing to 
“punch” a “joint ticket” within the operational military.221 Today, 
the 1,000+ uniformed members of the Joint Staff may be the single 
most talented and effective staff in the entire U.S. government. It is 
enormously prestigious to work within the Pentagon’s corridors, due 
in large part to the incentive structure established by Goldwater-
Nichols.222 The CJCS has the final say, too, on who joins the staff.223 
The Secretaries of the military departments nominate the officers—
the CJCS ultimately selects who serves on the staff.224 
 
 216  See 10 U.S.C. § 163(a)(1) (2012) (outlining how communications from combatant 
commands are transmitted). 
 217  Cf MCINNIS, supra note 115, at 9 (discussing that Colin Powell, the CJCS at the time, 
noted the lack of dissent within Operation Desert Storm).  
 218  Cf id. (citing Leighton Smith, A Commander’s Perspective, in THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS 
DOD REORGANIZATION ACT: A TEN-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE 29, 29 (Dennis J. Quinn ed., 1999)) 
(stating that the White House viewed the clarification of the chain of command as 
contributing to Operation Desert Storm’s success). 
 219  See 10 U.S.C. § 151(d) (2012) (setting forth how opinions and advice of Joint Chiefs of 
Staff are to be given to the CJCS and ultimately to Washington). 
 220  See 10 U.S.C. §§ 662, 665 (2012) (setting forth the promotion policy objectives for joint 
qualified officers and the policies for monitoring the careers of joint qualified officers). 
 221 See, e.g., James Joyner, Military’s Lock-Step Promotion System, OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY 
(Feb. 15, 2012) https://www.outsidethebeltway.com/militarys-lock-step-promotion-system/ 
(offering an Operation Desert Storm veteran’s view that the military promotion system for 
officers involves “successfully clearing a series of hoops” including punching a “Joint ticket”).  
 222  See Goldwater-Nichols Hearing, supra note 15, at 35 (statement by Dr. Hamre) (“Service 
chiefs are, by far, the most important people in the [Pentagon] . . . . Service Chiefs are all-
powerful.”).  
 223  10 U.S.C. § 155(a)(2) (2012). 
 224  Id. 
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The centralization of military advice streamlines information for 
civilian decision-makers, but it also imposes institutional costs.225 
As Judge Posner and Professor O’Donnell have articulated in the 
context of intelligence reform, centralization reduces competition 
between agencies, places an excessive focus on consensus, and less 
consideration of low-probability yet high-magnitude threats.226 No 
longer is inter-service rivalry the defining feature of the operational 
military; unification and centralization are the defining features.227 
While inter-service rivalry certainly had its costs (and still exists at 
some diminished level), it has decreased dramatically since 
President Truman’s earlier warnings.228 But the military has also 
lost any positive and powerful counterbalancing effects from these 
rivalries. Inter-service rivalry has been replaced by a single, unified 
military voice and with it increased military authority and 
influence.229  
 
3. Congress Actively “Makes Rules and Regulations” for the 
Administrative Military but Not the Operational Military. 
 As discussed in Part II, Congress has an important 
constitutional role “to make Rules for the Government and 
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”230 This is not limited 
solely to the administrative land and naval Forces; it also includes 
the entire defense establishment and operational military 
 
 225  See, e.g., Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring 
and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1729 (2006) (proposing 
a framework for balancing decentralization and centralization in the intelligence 
community). 
 226  See RICHARD A. POSNER, PREVENTING SURPRISE ATTACKS: INTELLIGENCE REFORM IN 
THE WAKE OF 9/11, 42–43 (2005) (noting centralization ultimately results in depriving the 
President of a range of views and incomplete data). 
 227 See, e.g., MCINNIS, supra note 115, at 9 (citing Colin Powell) (“You will notice in Desert 
Storm nobody is accusing . . . the Army [of] fighting the Air Force and the Navy [of] fighting 
the Marine Corps. We are now a team. The Goldwater-Nichols legislation helped that.”).  
 228  See FEICKERT, supra note 29, at 3 (“Differences between the Army and Navy precluded 
any sort of unified command arrangement . . . .”). 
 229  See Dunlap, supra note 125, at 372 (noting that rivalry between military branches has 
been diminished); see also HUNTINGTON, supra note 197, at 87 (“If the officer corps . . . 
[becomes more] unified . . . ,this change will tend to increase its authority with regard to other 
institutions of government.”). 
 230  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.  
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organization.231 While Congress exercised its constitutional 
authority through the passage of the National Security Act and 
Goldwater-Nichols Act, it has played a considerably more passive 
role in the creation and modification of the operational military 
structure.232  
Under existing statutory authority and doctrine, the President 
has the sole authority to create new combatant commands (and 
subordinate war-fighting Joint Task Forces) without explicit 
congressional approval.233 Further, the President may revise the 
mission, responsibilities or force structure of an existing combatant 
command independent of Congress.234 In doing so, the President 
must notify Congress within 60 days, and this notification 
requirement is suspended during “hostilities or imminent threat of 
hostilities.”235  In turn, the combatant commander can create Joint 
Task Forces and subordinate commands without congressional 
approval.236 
Congress is largely absent from the development of the Unified 
Command Plan (UCP), the blueprint for the operational land and 
naval forces that establishes and modifies the boundaries of the 
geographic combatant commands. The CJCS prepares the UCP, 
which has evolved to become an executive branch document signed 
by the President that establishes, defines, and describes the role of 
each combatant commander.237 Driving military policy and 
establishing the operational military’s governing infrastructure, the 
UCP implements the statutory guidance for combatant commands 
 
 231  Cf CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42699, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: CONCEPTS AND 
PRACTICE 1 (2018) (noting that some interpret the Constitution to require Congressional 
authorization and approval before armed forces are deployed and utilized abroad).  
 232  See, e.g., Nathan Smith, Opinion, We need more congressional oversight on matters of 
war, THE HILL (Apr. 24, 2018) https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/384564-we-need-
more-congressional-oversight-on-matters-of-war (criticizing Congress for its lack of oversight 
during the Obama and Trump administrations). 
 233  10 U.S.C. § 161(a) (2012).  
 234  10 U.S.C. § 161(b)(2) (2012).  
 235  Id.  
 236  See JOINT PUBLICATION 1, supra note 56, at IV-1 (Commanders of unified [Combatant 
Commands] may establish subordinate unified commands . . . .”). 
 237  See DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 250 (defining the UCP as “[t]he document, 
approved by the President, that sets forth basic guidance to all unified combatant 
commanders”). 
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found in the National Security Act and Goldwater-Nichols Act.238 
Experts have described the UCP as a document “that has significant 
impact on how [combatant commands] are organized, trained, and 
resourced—areas over which Congress has constitutional 
authority.”239 But its development is nested within the operational 
military and executive branch with minimal input or oversight from 
Congress.240 To highlight the importance of the combatant 
command process, just last year a new combatant command—Cyber 
Command—was established with fairly minimal public debate.241 
Perhaps not surprisingly, at the time of this writing, Cyber 
Command is already seeking greater operational authority to 
launch offensive cyber operations.242 
Moreover, while the combatant commanders provide annual 
reports to Congress and testify annually, the administrative 
military leaders testify in front of Congress much more 
frequently.243 Indeed, not only is the frequency of administrative 
military-based testimony significantly higher than operational 
military commander testimony, but the purpose and nature of the 
testimony is qualitatively quite different. The administrative 
military is often on the receiving end of congressional investigation 
and inquiry while the operational military commanders are afforded 
a remarkable level of deference.244 The operational military is often 
 
 238  See id. The UCP elicits numerous questions that one would think would invite 
congressional involvement, such as: Why is Israel part of European Command, not Central 
Command? Why does Africa Command not include Egypt?And does Special Operations 
Command’s lack of geographic restrictions—allowing it to move into and out of the myriad 
geographic commands—create tension between special operators and the geographic 
combatant commanders? See FEICKERT, supra note 29, at 15, 28, 39 (exploring these 
questions). 
 239  FEICKERT, supra note 29, at Summary. 
 240  See, e.g., Turse, supra note 39 (noting the growth of Special Operations forces since 9/11 
without the oversight of Congress). 
  241   Lisa Ferdinando, Cybercom to Elevate to Combat Command, DOD NEWS (May 3, 
2018), https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1511959/cybercom-to-elevate-to-
combatant-command/. 
 242  See Patrick Tucker, A Fight is Brewing Between Congress and the Military Over Cyber 
War, DEFENSE ONE (Nov. 16, 2017), http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/11/fight-
brewing-between-congress-and-military-over-cyber-war/142616/?oref=d-topstory (stating 
that cyber capability is progressing at a rapid pace and that the Cyber Mission Force Team 
would achieve full operational capability approximately one year ahead of schedule). 
 243  See supra notes 34–35.  
 244  See MURDOCK ET AL., supra note 35 (discussing how Congress regularly calls 
administrative military heads when investigating the latest military fumbles, even if the 
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advocating for increased funding in that commander’s Area of 
Responsibility.245 Indeed, combatant commanders’ congressional 
testimony “can sway Congress and embarrass or impede the 
administration.”246 To highlight one example, the four-star 
combatant commander with oversight responsibilities over South 
America testified in front of congressional committees seventeen 
times in an attempt to advocate for increase funding for drug 
interdiction efforts.247  
Under a principal-agent model of civil-military relations, each 
agent (military) competes with their principal (Congress or the 
President) for independence and influence.248  And each geographic 
combatant commander likely competes with one another for the 
administrative military’s forces. After all, each Army battalion, 
Navy carrier strike group, or Air Force fighter squadron can only be 
in one place at one time. This sets up a dynamic whereby the 
geographic combatant commands advocate strongly for their 
respective regions of the world at the potential expense of other 
regions. Under Goldwater-Nichols, combatant commanders enjoy a 
special status within the DoD budgetary process: the Secretary of 
Defense is required to submit to Congress a separate budget 
proposal for each combatant command.249  
Geographically, today’s operational military operates far 
removed from Congress in some of the most remote parts of the 
world, and operational military decision-making is much more 
 
administrative military is not responsible or in the true operational chain of command); 
FEICKERT, supra note 29, at 1 (acknowledging, in contrast, that the combatant commanders’ 
reports typically involve budgetary matters).  
 245  See, e.g., Statement of General Joseph L. Votel On the Posture of U.S. Central 
Command—Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) Hearing Feb. 5, 2019, U.S. CENTRAL 
COMMAND: POSTURE STATEMENT, http://www.centcom.mil/ABOUT-US/POSTURE-
STATEMENT/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (thanking Congress for continual support and 
asking it to continue providing the Central Command with “everything they need” to 
accomplish their missions).  
 246  Richard Kohn, The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States 
Today, 55 NAVAL WAR C. REV. Summer 2002, at 17.  
 247  See Christoper J. Fettweis, Militarizing Diplomacy, in AMERICA’S VICEROYS 47, 53 
(Derek Reveron ed., 2004) (discussing the commander’s pursuit of Congressional funding 
through his numerous testimonies). 
 248  See generally FEAVER, supra note 50. 
 249  10 U.S.C. § 166 (2012). 
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likely to be classified.250 Thus, operational military commanders 
have a comparative information advantage over their congressional 
principles that are increasingly uninformed about operational 
decision-making, leading to further bureaucratic drift. These 
differences lead the administrative military, whose resource aims 
are aligned with congressional interests in job creation, to compete 
with the operational military for resources and funding, which is 
discussed below.  
Therefore, when discussing civilian control of the military, it is 
important to inquire about civilian control over which military. 
Operational military authorities are increasingly delegated to the 
executive and the vast operational military apparatus.251 This trend 
has only intensified during the Trump Administration.252 Congress 
remains interested in military matters but is disproportionately 
focused on the nitty-gritty details of administrative military 
functions, such as the vast, inefficient, and costly military 
acquisitions process discussed below. Today, the administrative 
military is the outsized focus of Congress, D.C. policymakers, and 
the vast military contracting apparatus eager to tap into valuable 
DoD acquisition and procurement funds.253 And each year Congress 
passes a National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that largely 
focuses on core administrative military matters.254  
So how does Congress provide oversight over operational military 
matters?  The most powerful tool remains funding cutoffs that 
target specific military operations.255 But absent an express 
appropriations prohibition on a specific military operation, the 
 
  250   See   David Vine, Where in the World is the U.S. Military?, POLITICO MAGAZINE  
(July/Aug. 2015), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/06/us-military-bases-
around-the-world-119321 (noting the United States maintains approximately 800 military 
bases in more than 70 countries); see also Turse, supra note 41 (reporting that Congress is 
unaware of many current military operations).   
 251  See Michael Gordon, Trump Shifting Authority Over Military Operations Back to 
Pentagon, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2019, at A1 (noting the current executive administration’s 
efforts to control military operations).  
 252  Id.  
 253  See Fallows, supra note 191 (noting that a large portion of debates in D.C. on the 
military surround the budget given to the administrative military).  
 254  See Schifrin, supra note 36 (noting that the NDAA is one of Congress’s primary tools to 
define the military’s direction in the upcoming year). 
 255  See generally RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20775, 
CONGRESSIONAL USE OF FUNDING CUTOFFS SINCE 1970 INVOLVING U.S. MILITARY FORCES 
AND OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS (Jan 16, 2007).  
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already established operational military structure located 
throughout the world continually tips the balance in favor of the 
Commander in Chief in operational matters. Further, combatant 
commanders may continually capitalize upon their statutory 
authority to establish subordinate commands—the all-important 
joint task forces—that are even further removed from 
administrative law and congressional oversight.256  
B. THE TWO-MILITARY DIVIDE’S SECOND LEGACY: THE 
MILITARIZATION OF FOREIGN POLICY 
Under the operational and administrative military divide, the 
geographic combatant commanders now exercise an increasingly 
important role in America’s foreign policy.257 They are increasingly 
seen as “effectively displac[ing] American ambassadors and the 
State Department as the primary instruments of American foreign 
policy.”258 The combatant commanders’ core mission includes the 
broadly defined military to military engagement and fostering close 
relations with host nations (many of them economic beneficiaries of 
DoD’s overseas apparatus).259 And the status of the geographic 
combatant commanders has only increased since Goldwater-
Nichols’s passage in 1986.260 Indeed, the capstone billet for senior 
officers is now serving as the head of a geographic combatant 
command or CJCS, not as the heads of the Army, Navy, Air Force, 
and Marines.261  
For example, General James Jones departed his administrative 
military position as Commandant of the Marine Corps to serve as 
the European Commander—demonstrating that even the hallowed 
position of Commandant was a mere stepping-stone to something 
 
 256  John Yoo, Administration of War, 58 DUKE L.J. 2277, 2283–92 (2008) (discussing the 
military’s growing independence from political leadership since the end of World War II). 
 257  See Reveron & Gavin, supra note 4, at 1–15 (discussing the power and influence of 
Combatant Commanders in foreign policy). 
 258  Kohn, supra note 246, at 17. 
 259  See FEICKERT, supra note 29, at 1 (stating that the combatant commands, and thus the 
combatant commanders as their leadership, are responsible for both executing military policy 
and for playing an important role in foreign policy).  
 260  See discussion supra Part IV.A..  
 261  See Reveron & Gavin, supra note 4, at 1–2 (noting the prestige of the Combatant 
Commander role).  
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bigger in the operational military.262 While the military has always 
conducted a host of activities that are closer to traditional foreign 
policy functions, its role in diplomacy has grown substantially in the 
recent past.263  
This trend will persist at least for the near term, due to actions 
within the Trump Administration that amplify the operational 
military’s foreign policy influence. The military is increasingly 
called upon to perform traditional foreign policy functions and fill 
the void left behind by massive personnel shortages at the State 
Department.264 Geographic combatant commanders are already 
present throughout the world and possess comparably large staffs 
and deep relationships with the nations in their region.265 State 
Department ambassadorships remain unfilled.266 Diplomats are 
resigning en masse and may never be replaced.267 The preexisting 
massive overseas operational military apparatus thus becomes the 
de facto voice of both the American military and diplomacy. The 
 
 262  See Jim Jones Fast Facts, CNN.COM (Jan. 2, 2019, 2:54 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2013/08/20/us/jim-jones-fast-facts/index.html. 
 263   See, e.g., Reveron & Gavin, supra note 4, at 2–3 (outlining the importance of the 
diplomatic dimensions of combatant commanders’ roles in recent decades).  
 264  Within military doctrine, the United States employs all the instruments of national 
power under the “DIME” paradigm (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). See 
JOINT PUBLICATION 1, supra note 56, at I-4 (“[W]aging war should involve the use of all 
instruments of national power that one group can bring to bear against another (diplomatic, 
informational, military, and economic).”). 
 265  See Combatant Commands, supra note 12 (listing the places where geographic 
combatant commanders are stationed around the world). 
 266  See Ambassador Assignments Overseas, U.S. DEP’T OF ST., 
https://www.state.gove/documents/organization/288550.pdf (Jan. 2, 2019, 12:13PM) (listing 
every State Department ambassadorship and denoting the posts which are vacant).  
 267  See, e.g., Lesley Wroughton, Top U.S. Diplomat for Europe Resigns, Cites Personal, 
Professional Reasons, Reuters (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
europe-diplomat/top-u-s-diplomat-for-europe-resigns-cites-personal-professional-reasons-
idUSKCN1PG24Z (reporting the resignation of diplomat Wess Mitchell); John Hudson et al., 
U.S. Envoy to Coalition Fighting ISIS Resigns in Protest of Trump’s Syria Decision, WASH. 
Post (Dec. 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-envoy-to-
coalition-fighting-isis-resigns-in-protest-of-trumps-syria-decision/2018/12/22/a5f42bc0-0606-
11e9-b5df-5d3874f1ac36_story.html (reporting the resignation of diplomat Brett McGurk); 
Gardiner Harris, Diplomats Sound the Alarm as They Are Pushed Out in Droves, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/24/us/politics/state-department-
tillerson.html (discussing the departure of Bill A. Miller). For an in-depth critique of 
American foreign policy and its increasing reliance on the military, see generally FARROW, 
supra note 31. 
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combatant commanders and their staffs provide continuity—albeit 
a military-focused one—through changeovers in administrations.268  
Military geographic combatant commanders also have several 
strategic advantages over the State Department and its diplomatic 
corps. Ambassadorships and foreign policy officials overseas are 
assigned to a single nation.269 And ambassadorships often remain 
vacant for extended periods.270 Combatant commands are never 
vacant.271 Further, military combatant commanders have a broader 
scope and can focus on enormous geographic regions of fifty-plus 
nations within their respective Area of Responsibility.272 Their 
permanent headquarters staff often exceeds 1,000 military officers, 
and subordinate commands under their control far exceed that 
number.273  
Beyond their headquarters staffs, military combatant 
commanders have military attachés in each nation that work hand 
in hand with host nations and their foreign policy apparatus.274 
Their relationships run deep.275 Foreign military sales and the 
allure of additional military funding incentivize foreign government 
 
 268  See Vasilios Tasikas, Developing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan: The Need for a New 
Strategic Paradigm, 2007 ARMY L. 45, 58 (2007) (discussing the continuity fostered by the 
combatant command structure).  
 269  See Ambassador Assignments Overseas, supra note 266 (listing the individual countries 
to which each ambassador is assigned).  
 270  See, e.g., Thomas F. Farr & William L. Saunders, Jr., The Bush Administration and 
America’s International Religious Freedom Policy, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 949, 956 (2009) 
(noting that an ambassadorship remained vacant for almost twenty months until John V. 
Hanford III took the post).  
 271  See DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates from the Pentagon, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Apr. 
23, 2008), http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4216 
(demonstrating the rapidity with which combatant command posts are filled once vacant, so 
as to virtually never be vacant).  
 272 See European Command Fact Sheets, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND 
http://www.eucom.mil/about/history/fact-sheets (last visited Feb. 2, 2017) (providing an 
overview of the European Command); see also Area of Responsibility, U.S. AFR. COMMAND, 
https://www.africom.mil/area-of-responsibility (last visited Feb. 9, 2019) (listing the fifty-
three nations within the U.S. African Command’s Area of Responsibility).  
 273  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 211, at 12.  
 274  See, e.g., About the Command, U.S. AFR. COMMAND, https://africom.mil/about-the-
command (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (noting that “the command’s program in Africa are 
coordinated through Offices of Security Cooperation and Defense Attaché Offices”).  
 275  See, e.g., id. (listing all the ways by which the African combatant command is able to 
“establish and sustain relationships”). 
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to strengthen those relationships.276 There is a blurring of the lines 
between traditional military-to-military engagement and more 
traditional diplomatic functions.277 Indeed, combatant commanders 
have an important voice on such matters, and Congress funds them 
extremely well.278  Further, they have at their disposal an enormous 
personal staff and their own “mini-airline” to include a fleet of 
military aircraft with secure communications.279 Combatant 
commanders can be whisked away at a moment’s notice anywhere 
they please.280 When foreign governmental leaders look at American 
actors overseas and assess who is truly well-funded and resourced, 
the geographic combatant commanders surely come out on top.  
Consider the case of European Command, which has been in 
place since 1946 with an enormous engagement mission.281 Just 
eighteen combatant commanders have led European Command 
since the end of World War II.282 How many individual U.S. 
ambassadorships across Europe have been held throughout that 
timeframe? The headquarters staff alone has a permanent presence 
of over 1,500 personnel; that number triples when taking into 
account subordinate staffs.283 Today, there are 50,000-plus active-
duty personnel in Europe spread over 250 pieces of individual real 
estate.284  
 
 276  See Reveron & Gavin, supra note 4, at 4–7, 101 (describing how U.S. Military funding 
to foreign governments encourages cooperation and fosters strong foreign relationships).  
 277  See id. at 7 (“The advantages of the [DoD] and disadvantages of the State Department 
facilitate the ability of combatant commanders to influence policy.”). 
 278  See id. at 6 (“In 2006, combatant commanders are expected to control $30 billion 
compared to $400 million in the past.”). 
 279  See, e.,g., About USTRANSCOM, U.S. TRANSP. COMMAND, 
https://www.ustranscom.mil/cmd/aboutustc.cfm (last visited Feb. 10, 2019) (listing the 
number of aircrafts available for combatant commands).  
 280  See id. (“USTRANSCOM delivers globally integrated mobility, deployment and 
distribution solutions, and enabling capabilities for full-spectrum requirements in support of 
national objectives.”). 
 281  See History, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, https://www/eucom.mil/about/history/history 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2019). 
 282 See Gen. Curtis M. Scaparrotti, EUCOM, https://www.eucom.mil/commander (last vistied 
Feb. 19, 2019) (listing Scaparrotti as the Combatant Commander of European Command 
since late spring of 2016, taking over from General Breedlove as the 18th Commander).  
 283  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 211, at 12 (charting the thousands of 
personnel working for European Command).  
 284  See European Command Fact Sheets, supra note 272 (listing the number of active duty 
personnel and the locations of European Command).  
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Finally, geographic combatant commanders increasingly play a 
leadership role within the executive branch and foreign relations 
more generally following their retirement from the military.285 For 
example, General James Mattis (former Central Commander) was 
recently the Secretary of Defense,286 and General John Kelly (former 
Southern Commander) served as White House Chief of Staff from 
2017 to early 2019.287 Admiral Harry Harris (head of Pacific 
Command) is America’s newest ambassador to South Korea.288 A 
former Pacific Commander (Admiral Joseph Prueher) served as the 
U.S. ambassador to China upon his retirement.289 General Anthony 
Zinni (former Central Commander) served as U.S. special envoy to 
the Middle East,290 and General James Jones (former European 
Commander) served as President Obama’s National Security 
Advisor.291 And of course the first CJCS after Goldwater-Nichols, 
Colin Powell, served as Secretary of State.292 
C. THE TWO-MILITARY’S THIRD LEGACY: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACTS’S (APA) UNEVEN 
APPLICATION TO THE TWO MILITARIES  
While the judiciary has historically been the least influential of 
the three branches in ensuring civilian control over the military, 
judicial review via the APA remains an important vehicle in 
ensuring accountability over all federal agencies, and the DoD is no 
 
 285  See Mark R. Shulman, Support and Defend: Civil-Military Relations in the Age of 
Obama, 443 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 409, 443 (2012) (“[T]he United States has experienced a 
militarization of foreign relations. The increased resources invested in diplomacy, public 
diplomacy, and nonmilitary foreign aid pale in comparison to the . . . influence of Regional 
Combatant Commands . . . .”). 
 286  James N. Mattis Biography, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., https://dod.defense.gov/About/
Biographies/Biography-View/Article/1055835/james-mattis/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2019).  
 287  John F. Kelly Biography, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., https://dod.defense.gov/About/
Biographies/Biography-View/Article/602724/john-f-kelly/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2019). 
 288  Ambassador Harry Harris, U.S. EMBASSY & CONSULATE IN S. KOR., 
https://kr.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/our-ambassador/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2019).  
 289  See Reveron & Gavin, supra note 4, at 2.  
 290  Anthony Zinni Biography, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, https://www.centcom.mil/ABOUT-
US/LEADERSHIP/Bio-Article-View/Article/904782/anthony-zinni/ (last visited Feb. 19, 
2019).  
 291  General James L. Jones, Jr., ATLANTIC COUNCIL, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/
about/experts/list/james-jones#fullbio (last visited Feb. 19, 2019).  
 292  See Reveron & Gavin, supra note 4, at 2.  
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exception.293 Indeed, citizen suits—particularly in environmental 
law—ensure a continual level of accountability between the military 
and the citizenry.294 The APA provides that connective tissue 
between the citizenry and the military (via the judiciary).295 In light 
of the DoD’s unique mission, and the two-military divide, a 
fundamental question arises: Should administrative law and the 
APA treat the operational military differently from the 
administrative military? 
Despite the DoD’s size, budget, and idiosyncratic mission, 
administrative law scholarship has “generally passed over the study 
of the military in favor of the domestic agencies.”296 Indeed, very 
little legal scholarship has addressed the APA’s applicability to the 
DoD (despite its status as the largest federal agency).297  
The APA (passed in 1946, just one year before the National 
Security Act) provides for judicial review over agency actions and 
sets out procedures that agencies must follow when promulgating 
rules and adjudicating conflicts.298 The APA has been described as 
a “mini-Constitution” and widely praised as a mechanism to help 
ensure democratic accountability and oversight over federal 
agencies.299 But the APA was designed for a far different time and 
does not adequately take into account: (1) the DoD’s existing legal 
architecture and two-military divide; and (2) the complexity of 
 
 293  See Dunlap, supra note 125, at 368–70 (providing a brief overview of the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence regarding the military). 
 294  See, e.g., Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 16 (2008) (suing Donald C. Winter, 
Secretary of the Navy, for violating environmental laws). 
 295  See Arthur E. Bonfield, Military and Foreign Affairs Rule-Making Under the APA, 71 
MICH. L. REV. 221, 221–26 (1972) (discussing how the APA ensures public participation in 
the administrative rulemaking schemes, including those of the military).  
 296  Yoo, supra note 256, at 2281. For additional discussions of administrative-law 
scholarship on the military, see generally Thomas R. Folk, The Administrative Procedure Act 
and the Military Departments, 6 J. NAT’L ASS’N OF ADMIN. L. JUD. 109 (1986); Bonfield, supra 
note 295. 
 297  There are some rare exceptions. See Kovacs, supra note 195, at 584 (arguing that there 
is no basis for courts to give greater deference to the military); Jonathan Masur, A Hard Look 
or a Blind-Eye, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 512 (2006) (discussing how the Department of Justice, 
DoD, Department of Homeland Security, and other war-related agencies are subject to review 
under APA §706 but that this is often overlooked). 
 298  See, e.g., JAMES RASBAND ET AL. NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 223 (2009) 
(praising the many virtues of the APA in democratic governance).  
 299  See ABA, Resolution Adopted by the House of Delegates August 8–9, 2011, R.124 (2011) 
(“Over time, the APA has become a ‘mini Constitution’ that provides fundamental fairness 
for litigants before administrative agencies.”). 
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modern military operations to include the numerous military 
activities that take place overseas outside of war. The APA was 
better suited to regulate military activities, but it has not kept pace 
with changes to the massive military organization and the nature 
of modern warfare. This results in a disconnect between the APA’s 
text and its ongoing applicability to the modern military 
organization.  
 
1. The APA’s Definition of Agency Clearly Applies to the 
Administrative Military but Lacks a Clear Application to the 
Operational Military 
The APA broadly defines “agency” as “each authority of the 
Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or 
subject to review by another agency.”300 Congress, courts, and 
governments of the United States are specifically exempt from the 
agency definition.301 While the President is not specifically exempt, 
courts have routinely held that the President is not an agency 
within the APA’s meaning.302 This is of particular importance for 
military matters due to the President’s role as Commander in Chief.  
However, “agency” includes the Secretary of Defense and the 
civilian Secretaries of the military departments who remain subject 
to suit under the APA. This conclusion is reaffirmed by the text of 
the APA’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) section, which 
specifically applies to any executive department or military 
department.303 And the Secretary of Defense and civilian 
Secretaries of the military departments are routinely sued.304 
Because the APA “agency” definition clearly applies to the civilian 
heads of the administrative military, it follows that APA litigation 
 
 300  5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 301  5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(A)–(D) (2012). 
 302  See Dalton v. Spencer, 511 U.S. 462, 470 (1994) (“The actions of the President, in turn, 
are not reviewable under the APA because . . . the President is not an ‘agency.’”). 
 303  The full section states that “agency” includes “any executive department, military 
department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other 
establishment in the executive branch.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1) (2012). And Section 552a of the 
APA, entitled “Records maintained on individuals” shares this same definition of “agency.” 5 
U.S.C. § 552a (2012). See also Mark P. Nevitt, Defending the Environment: A Mission for the 
World’s Militaries, 36 HAW. L. REV 27, 36 (2014) (describing how the APA serves an important 
role in helping to ensure civilian control over the military). 
 304  See, e.g., Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (suing the Secretary of the 
Navy for violating environmental laws).  
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is focused on administrative military functions via lawsuits against 
the Secretary of Defense or civilian Secretaries of military 
departments. For example, the Secretaries of Defense and military 
departments were the defendants in numerous lawsuits challenging 
the forthcoming change in transgender service policy.305  
It is less clear whether the heads of the operational military 
(combatant commands and joint task force commands) are an 
“authority of the Government of the United States” within the 
APA’s agency definition.306 Although the operational military is not 
specifically exempt from judicial review, it remains unclear how the 
APA applies to the operational military. No lawsuit to date has held 
that an agency includes a combatant commander or subordinate 
operational commander, although a suit against the Secretary of 
Defense as the head of the operational military remains possible.307  
In addition, much of the operational military’s decision-making 
(particularly by the geographic combatant commanders) takes place 
outside the United States, where it is not clearly subject to the 
APA’s reach, which lacks a clear extraterritorial application.308  
Finally, for an APA suit to come forward, actual knowledge of an 
agency action is required; a particular problem for operational 
military matters that occur outside the United States, are out of 
sight, and are often classified.309 Secrecy is itself a form of 
regulation, bypassing traditional forms of judicial review or civilian 
control.310  
Daugherty v. United States, a non-precedential opinion, remains 
the one federal case addressing the peculiarities of the APA and the 
 
 305  See Mark P. Nevitt, A Tumultuous Year for Transgender Service Members, REG. REV., 
(Jan. 31, 2018) https://www.theregreview.org/2018/01/31/nevitt-tumultuous-year-
transgender-service-members/ (providing a timeline of these actions). 
 306  5 U.S.C. §551(1) (2012).  
 307  Nor have they held otherwise. The law remains unsettled on this point. See infra notes 
311–35 and accompanying text. 
 308  See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“We assume that Congress 
legislates against the backdrop of the presumption against extraterritoriality.”).  
 309  See David Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 272 (2010) (providing a textualist 
view on how the President’s designation as Commander in Chief provides authority to conceal 
some military information).  
 310  See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 59–80 (1998) 
(devoting a chapter to the different ways government can regulate what its citizens know).  
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Goldwater-Nichols two-military divide.311 In Daugherty a service 
member attached to an operational military command in Spain filed 
a tort claim against the Secretary of Defense and Navy (among 
others).312 He asserted that the Goldwater-Nichols Act divested the 
Navy of any type of authority over him.313 The Tenth Circuit 
rejected that argument, focusing instead on the Act’s establishment 
of the administrative chain of command that served as an umbilical 
cord between the Navy and the service member.314 This 
administrative chain of command, as discussed in Part III, runs 
from the military member to the Secretary of the Navy and the 
Secretary of Defense. The court did not specifically address the 
combatant commander’s role; the judgment focused solely on 
administrative functions that could be traced back to the 
Secretaries of the military departments.315 There was no discussion 
of the operational chain of command, or on  whether the European 
Commander and the operational military leadership are subject to 
suit.316  
To be clear, I am not advocating that the APA should apply to 
truly operational military matters such as the tactical movement of 
forces or military raids. However, there is an expanding menu of 
activities undertaken by the operational military that have 
administrative components—hiring and firing personnel, 
responding to FOIA requests, issuing routine guidance—that is 
outside the formal rulemaking process and may not be subject to 
judicial review.317 Hence, to borrow from the nomenclature adopted 
by Professors Adrian Vermeule and David Dyzenhaus, an 
institutional hole emerges within the operational military.318 Any 
 
 311  See 73 Fed. Appx. 326, 327–32 (10th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the APA claim was not 
justiciable, due to the bifurcated authority within the military). This is a non-precedential 
10th Circuit opinion, further underscoring the lack of authority on the subject. 
 312  Id. at 328.  
 313  Id.   
 314  See id. at 331 (“[S]ection 165 of the Goldwater-Nichols Act . . . provided for the Secretary 
of the Navy to remain responsible for the administration of forces assigned to combatant 
commands.”).  
 315  See id. at 327–32 (not discussing the role of a combatant commander).  
 316  See id. (addressing neither the operational chain of command nor the liability of the 
Commander of European Command and the operational military leadership). 
 317  See Adrian Vermeule, supra note 47, at 1112 (noting that the “APA explicitly excludes 
‘military or foreign affairs’ functions from its procedural requirements,” but that these 
functions are not explicitly defined). 
 318  See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 
958  GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:905 
 
function associated with the three different types of operational 
military control (combatant command,319 operational control, or 
tactical control320) remains outside the APA’s reach. How does 
administrative law account for these activities? To date courts have 
yet to “pierce the operational veil” in applying the APA to such 
matters.321 Perhaps this stems from confusion about the two-
military chain of command or deference to military operational 
commanders. Regardless of the reason, it appears that the 
administrative military will continue to be subject to APA while 
courts will provide additional (if not absolute) deference to the 
operational military.  
 
2. APA Military Exemptions and Military Deference as Applied to 
the Operational and Administrative Militaries 
Since its passage in the aftermath of World War II, the APA has 
specifically exempted certain military activities based upon when 
they are occurring and what they do.322 Despite repeated calls to 
address or reform the APA’s military exemptions, they persist and 
are virtually unchanged from their original form.323 These express 
exemptions include “military authority exercised in the field in the 
time of war or in occupied territory” and “military or foreign affairs 
functions of the United States.”324 They amount to APA “black holes” 
 
 319 See 10 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1)(A)–(G) (2012) (outlining the command authority of combatant 
commanders). Under joint doctrine, this includes “[n]ontransferable command authority, 
which cannot be delegated, of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command 
over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces; assigning 
tasks; designating objectives; and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military 
operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the 
command.” DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 37. 
 320  See DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 175, 243 (defining both operational and tactical 
control).  
 321  The definition of combatant command includes an administrative component: 
“coordinating and approving those aspects of administration and support (including control 
of resources and equipment, internal organization, and training) and discipline necessary to 
carry out missions assigned to the command.” 10 U.S.C. § 164 (c)(1)(F) (2012).  
 322  See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(A)–(H) (2012) (listing exemptions to the definition of agency which 
include courts martial, military commissions and military authority exercised in the field in 
time of war); see also Kovacs, supra note 195, at 584 (arguing that there is no basis for courts 
to give greater deference to the military); Masur, supra note 297, at 512 (noting exemptions 
to the APA for military purpose).  
 323  See Bonfield, supra note 295, at 240–44 (discussing the APA exemption of “military 
function”). 
 324  5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1)(G), 553(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).  
 
2019] OPERATIONAL & ADMINISTRATIVE MILITARIES 959 
 
where military activities occur outside the constraints of judicial 
review.325   
The terms “military authority” and “in the field in the time of 
war” lack a clear definition (and we have not had a formal 
declaration of war since 1942).326 As this provision has not been 
modified since 1946, courts have struggled to apply this exemption 
to modern conflicts.327 As a fundamental matter, modern military 
activities cannot be neatly placed in clear legal categories. The 
division between war and peace remains murky.  
The APA’s rulemaking and adjudications section exempts 
“military or foreign affairs functions of the United States.”328 The 
term “military function” is of central importance but it, too, lacks a 
clear statutory definition.329 Despite this exemption’s broad 
implications as applied to DoD, it has not been the subject of much 
legal scholarship; nor have judicial decisions provided helpful 
guidance on its precise meaning.330 The APA also broadly excludes 
from review agency action “committed to agency discretion by 
law.”331 This catchall exclusion has been used to preclude review in 
national security contexts.332  
 
 325  See Vermeule, supra note 47, at 1107–1117 (defining APA “black holes”). 
 326  The last time the United States Congress exercised its constitutional authority to do so 
was 1942 in the middle of the Second World War when the U.S. declared war against 
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. See Franke-Ruta, supra note 7 (noting all three 
declarations in table 1).  
 327  See Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370, 1381 (1991) (determining that the decision to use 
unapproved drugs on servicemen in combat during the Persian Gulf War was subject to 
judicial review); see also Thomas R. Folk, The Administrative Procedure Act and the Military 
Departments, 6 J. NAT’L ASS’N OF ADMIN. L. JUDGES 109, 114 (1986) (noting the lack of 
guidance given by courts). 
 328  5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 329  See Bonfield, supra note 295, at 240–42 (discussing different possible interpretations of 
“military function”). 
 330  This exemption has only been comprehensively addressed by a single law review article 
dating back forty years. See Bonfield, supra note 295, at 240–41 (arguing that based on the 
plain meaning, the exemption applies to the extent that there are “‘clearly and directly’ 
involved in . . . matters specifically fitted for, appropriate to, or expected of the armed forces 
in light of their peculiar nature and qualifications”). 
 331  5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)–(2) (2012). 
 332  See, e.g., Riverkeeper Inc. v. Collins, 359 F.3d. 156, 171 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that 
Congress through the APA has not given the court’s jurisdiction to review agency action the 
national security context). 
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Perhaps not surprisingly, the DoD has often sought a broad 
interpretation of these APA exemptions.333 This is somewhat 
understandable; it seems absurd to subject critical war making and 
tactical decision-making to judicial review.334 In addition, courts 
will always afford a certain amount of deference to the DoD in 
reviewing its actions, regardless of its activity.335 
The question remains, what level of deference should be afforded 
to the expanding menu of military actions performed by an 
operational military commander outside of an armed conflict such 
as training, engagement, or routine administrative functions 
(FOIA, hiring and firing, etc.) embedded within the command? It is 
unclear what level of deference a court can or should afford to the 
operational military vis-à-vis the administrative military and how 
to weigh the relevant factors in determining the deference 
afforded.336 And rules regulating military functions as applied to 
military contractors are exempt from following the APA rulemaking 
process.337  
 
 333 See Bonfield, supra note 295, at 257 (“The term ‘military function’ is viewed by those 
who must apply it as being very broad in scope. . . . . The [DoD], for example, is likely to rely 
on the ‘military function’ exemption. . . .”). 
 334  See Wu Tien Li-Shou v. United States, 777 F.3d 175, 186 (4th Cir. 2015) (refusing to 
call into question the command structures of an existing military operation). 
 335  See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983) (noting that the Court will 
“hesitate long” before interfering in the relationship between military personnel and their 
superior officers); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (holding that the Court is not well 
positioned to interfere in composition, training, equipping and control of the military force, 
or core administrative military functions).  
 336  In a Supreme Court decision dating from 2006, Justice Breyer struggled with the level 
of deference that should be afforded to the military in Winter v. NRDC.  
I don’t know anything about this. I’m not a naval officer. But if I see an 
admiral come along with an affidavit that says . . . you’ve got to train people 
[when there are certain types of oceanographic conditions] all right, or there 
will be subs hiding there with all kinds of terrible weapons, and he swears 
that under oath. And I see on the other side a district judge who just says, 
you’re wrong, I then have to look to see what the basis is, because I know 
that district judge doesn’t know about it either.  
Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 55 U.S. 7 (2008) (No. 
07-1239) [hereinafter Breyer Oral Argument].  
 337  See Indep. Guard Ass’n, Local No. 1 v. O’Leary, 57 F.3d 766, 770 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(construing the military function narrowly as applied to the Department of Energy while 
noting that “[t]o our knowledge, no court has ever considered whether the military function 
exception applies to civilian contractors”). 
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Doe v. Sullivan may offer some guidance.338 In Doe, a service 
member used the APA to challenge the HHS Secretary’s decision to 
allow DoD to use an unapproved drug in the event of a chemical 
nerve gas attack.339 In dismissing the service member’s complaint, 
the court refused to apply the “military authority” exception, not 
seeing this decision as part of a military exigency.340 Nevertheless, 
the court hinted in dicta of a more generalized Commander-in-Chief 
exemption that if applied broadly would eliminate an enormous 
swath of operational military decisions from examination under the 
APA (as opposed to statutory delegation based on other 
constitutional provisions).341 This would appear to “immunize 
administrative actions that rely upon the President’s constitutional 
Commander-in-Chief power,”342 an authority wholly independent of 
APA oversight with an outsized effect on operational military 
matters: 
 
Plaintiffs seek review under the Administrative 
Procedure Act . . . of a rule published in the Federal 
Register by the Secretary of HHS, who is not part of any 
military chain of command . . .[w]hen he adopted the 
rule, [the Secretary] did not purport to be exercising the 
President’s powers as Commander in Chief . . . .343 
 
Courts have struggled mightily to apply a consistent and uniform 
standard when determining the level of deference to afford to the 
military. For example, in Gilligan v. Morgan, the Court stated: 
 
[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental 
activity in which the courts have less competence. The 
complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the 
composition, training, equipping, and control of a 
 
  338    938 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1991).  
 339  Id. at 1380.  
 340  See id. at 1380–81 (finding the matter suitable for judicial review because it was “not a 
dispute over military strategy or discipline, not one between soldiers and their superiors, but 
one over the scope of the authority Congress has entrusted to the FDA”). 
 341  See Masur, supra note 297, at 513 (describing how the dicta in Doe, if adopted would 
shield many actions from scrutiny). 
 342  Id.  
 343  Doe, 938 F.2d at 1380 (quoting plaintiff’s counsel). 
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military force are essentially military judgments, 
subject always to the civilian control of the Legislative 
and Executive Branches.344 
 
The military deference doctrine is premised on both the 
Executive and Legislative Branches exercising some modicum of 
control.345 But there has been a continual derogation of civilian 
control over operational military matters.346 How should 
administrative law account for this?  
And for the first time in modern history, the Supreme Court lacks 
active-duty veteran representation among its members.347 While it 
still remains unclear what impact this will have on the Court’s 
application of the military deference doctrine, the Court’s firsthand 
wartime military knowledge has disappeared for the time being.348 
Further complicating matters, military deference standards are 
flexible and prone to manipulation in the national security context: 
“federal courts manipulate flexible legal standards to accord 
heightened deference to federal agencies during national crises, 
transforming standards such as ‘reasonableness’ and ‘good cause’ 
into ‘grey holes.’”349  
 
3. Secrecy as Self-Regulation350 
 Finally, a significant number of military actions occur without 
the knowledge of the American public and are afforded what 
 
 344  Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10; see also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) 
(stating that the judiciary “must give great deference to the professional judgment of military 
authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest”).  
 345  See Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10 (basing the Court’s deference on the commitment of control 
to the Legislative and Executive Branches).  
 346  See infra Part IV.A (describing the centralization of military power and the diminishing 
civilian control of the operational military).  
 347  See Andrew Cohen, None of the Supreme Court Justices Has Battle Experience, THE 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 13, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/08/none-of-the-
supreme-court-justices-has-battle-experience/260973 (noting that with the retirement of 
Justice Stevens in 2010, the Supreme Court lacked a justice with wartime military experience 
for the first time since 1936).  
 348  See id. (noting that Justice Alito served in the Army Reserves in the 1970s and that 
Justice Breyer was in the Army briefly during college in 1957). 
 349  Evan Criddle, Mending Holes in the Rule of (Administrative) Law, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 309, 309 (2010). 
 350  This term is borrowed from the writing of Daniel Patrick Moynihan, discussed supra 
note 310. 
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amounts to blanket military deference.351 This further shields the 
operational military from civilian and administrative law oversight. 
Compounding matters, while much of the administrative military’s 
actions and regulations are open, easily accessible, and unclassified, 
much of the operational military’s internal regulations and decision-
making are outside the public domain and hidden.352  
Within the DoD, over-classification of documents and material 
that do not merit classification remains a continual problem.353 
Indeed, citizen suits and judicial review are predicated on actual 
knowledge of the underlying regulation and some degree of 
familiarity to understand the regulation and its practical impact. 
This is particularly difficult for operational military matters that 
occur outside the United States.354 After all, how can the public 
make a determination whether an agency properly interpreted its 
internal guidance if it is classified or otherwise not easily accessible 
to the public?355 
Finally, in the national security context, courts will often 
ascertain whether there is an affirmative legal obligation when 
determining if an agency action is even reviewable.356 The 
operational military has considerably more discretion in its actions 
 
 351  Cf Masur, supra note 297, at 449 (describing the court’s acceptance of the Executive 
argument that “an entire range of military questions . . . are entirely beyond the court’s 
reach”). 
 352  For example, the Department of Defense and all the Secretaries of the Military 
Departments have open websites that organize all the applicable internal regulations to that 
agency. See, e.g., Forms, Directives, and Instructions, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., 
https://dod.defense.gove/Resources/Forms-Directives/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (compiling 
links to internal regulations). Contrast this to the operational combatant commands whose 
regulations and policies are not easily accessible to the public and are oftentimes classified. 
See, e.g., Freedom of Information (FOIA Request), U.S. CYBER COMMAND, 
https://www.cybercom.mil/FOIA/Making-a-Freedom-of-Information-Act-FOIA-Request/ (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2019) (displaying only an explanation on how to make a FOIA request rather 
than offering relevant information about regulations and policies on the website). 
 353 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSPECTOR GENERAL, DOD EVALUATION OF OVER-
CLASSIFICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION (2013) (acknowledging and evaluating 
persistent misclassification and over-classification of documents within the DoD).. 
 354  See Pozen, supra note 309, at 299 (“[T]he United States has a long and pervasive history 
of executive branch secrecy in matters relating to internal deliberations and military 
strategy.”). 
 355  See id., at 286 (discussing arguments against state secrecy and stating that concealing 
activities “reduces the ability of the people . . . to monitor those activities and to identify and 
debate relevant issues in an informed manner”). 
 356 See, e.g., ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 678 (6th Cir. 2007) (discussing in dicta the 
meaning of “agency action” under the APA).  
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as compared to the administrative military; this adds a final level 
of deference in determining whether their action is reviewable. For 
example, a federal court that recently considered the National 
Security Agency’s program for warrantless electronic surveillance 
of suspected terrorists stated (in dicta) that the terrorist 
surveillance program was not an “agency action” covered by the 
APA as there was no legal obligation to conduct the surveillance.357  
D. THE TWO-MILITARY DIVIDE’S FOURTH LEGACY: AN INCREASINGLY 
DIVIDED MILITARY, UNDERMINING OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 
First, the two-military divide leads to continual, bureaucratic 
tension between the administrative military leaders and the 
operational, uniformed military commanders. Consider this 
comment from a DoD expert on the dual administrative and 
operational military divide: 
 
Service chiefs are, by far, the most important people in 
the [Pentagon] when it comes to physical things, real 
things, people, equipment, training, et cetera. Service 
chiefs are all-powerful. When it comes to operations in 
the field, they’re not in the game . . . we’ve got two 
different channels where power is exercised, but it only 
comes together at the Secretary [of Defense].358  
 
As discussed in Part III, under Goldwater-Nichols there are two 
distinct chains of command with the administrative military legally 
required to provide forces to the operational military.359 The parallel 
chains of command only meet at the very top of the DoD at the 
Secretary of Defense.360 This places an enormous strain on one 
person, the Secretary of Defense, who suffers from continual 
overextension as the critical intermediary between the two 
 
 357  See id. (stating that plaintiffs failed to complain of “agency action” as it was defined in 
the APA because the surveillance program constituted “conduct, not ‘agency action’”). Since 
this ruling, Cyber Command has been split off from the NSA and is now a full-fledged 
combatant command. See Ferdinando, supra note 241 (announcing the creation of Cyber 
Command).  
 358  Goldwater-Nichols Hearing, supra note 15, at 35. 
 359  See supra Part III; see also 10 U.S.C. § 162(b) (2012) (describing the split in the chain of 
command). 
 360 See Goldwater-Nichols Hearing, supra note 15, at 35.  
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militaries and must continuously bridge the operational and 
administrative military divide while reconciling their competing 
interests.361  
As new weapons are produced, older weaponry continues to be 
maintained.362 The maintenance cost for the older weaponry and 
material is often much, much lower, but the money, jobs, and 
governmental funding lies in the newer, shinier equipment.363 So a 
perverse incentive emerges to fund new equipment and weaponry, 
regardless of whether the operational military even needs it.364 This 
has led to bizarre instances where the DoD receives weapons and 
equipment that it has not asked for and does not want.365 Consider 
the following two examples. 
First, the  tension between the operational and administrative 
military over replacing the A-10 “Warthog” attack jet, a Vietnam-
era plane that was widely lauded by operational military 
commanders,366 with the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). 367  As the JSF 
came into production, Congress sought to phase out the Air Force’s 
use of the A-10 earlier than desired by the operational military 
commanders.368 Keeping the A-10s in service would lower the 
number of JSFs that the DoD purchased.369 A standoff occurred 
 
 361  See id. at 116 (discussing generally the problems associated with this divide and 
pointing to a “ponderousness, if not paralysis, because so many different organizations had 
to be involved in even the smallest decisions”). 
 362 See id. at 456–60 (discussing the problem of weaponry overspending and waste).  
 363 See GATES, supra note 44, at 459 (“The history of the Defense Department acquisition 
and development of new programs is rich in over-cost, overdue, and flawed programs.”). 
 364  See Matthew Cox, Pentagon Tells Congress to Stop Buying Equipment it Doesn’t Need, 
MILITARY.COM (Jan. 2015), https://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/01/28/pentagon-tells-
congress-to-stop-buying-equipment-it-doesnt-need.html (noting, for example, that Congress 
continues to give the Army millions of dollars for tank upgrades when the Army notes they 
“simply don’t have the structure” for such tanks anymore).  
 365  Id.; GATES, supra note 44, at 459–60 (discussing the cult of spending in the DoD). 
 366 See Martha McSally, Opinion, Saving a Plane that Saves Lives, N.Y. TIMES (April 20, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/20/opinion/saving-a-plane-that-saves-lives.html 
(praising the A-10 from her experience as an Air Force Colonel).  
 367  See Thomas Gibbons-Neff, The A-10 Get a Lease on Life–at Least Through 2017, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 14, 2016)  https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/01/14/the-
a-10-gets-a-lease-on-life-at-least-through-2017/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.94fc9b6b05f0 
(“[T]he Air Force decided to retire the A-10 to make way for more modern aircraft like the 
[JSF].”). 
 368  See id. (reporting that the then-Defense Secretary Ash Carter noted commanders’ 
demand for the A-10 in the fight against the Islamic State).  
 369  See Lara Seligman, Air Force Clarifies A-10 Retirement Plans, DEFENSE NEWS (Mar. 17, 
2016), https://www.defensenews.com/air/2016/03/17/air-force-clarifies-a-10-retirement-
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between the Air Force, Congress, and the operational military 
commanders.370 
 While the standoff was ultimately resolved and the A-10 was 
given a temporary reprieve, its long-term future remains very much 
in doubt.371   The JSF case study highlights a new phenomenon 
within the DoD: the administrative military provides forces to the 
operational military, but this occurs outside a direct command and 
control relationship or any clear accountability mechanism.372 
Again, it is only the Secretary of Defense who has the legal authority 
to referee disputes between the two militaries, but congressional 
interests can hinder even his authority.373 While the acquisition, 
testing, and development of the JSF is a core administrative 
military function, its eventual day-to-day operation overseas under 
the command of a combatant commander is an operational military 
function.374 And the administrative military is not clearly 
accountable to the operational military: under Goldwater-Nichols, 
they are not in the same direct chain of command.375 While the 
operational military is focused on operational military effectiveness 
on the battlefield above all else, the administrative military leaders 
operate under significant constraints and a far different incentive 
structure.376 This includes the watchful eye of Congress members, 
many of whom are interested in economic benefits to their 
individual congressional districts.377  
 
plans/ (stating that the budget for the Air Force would delay the A-10’s retirement and 
replacement with JSFs).  
 370 See Gibbons-Neff, supra note 367 (discussing the “Congressional blockade” and other 
strong stances about whether or not the A-10 should be retired).  
 371  See id. (stating that the A-10 will continue to be used beyond 2017); see also Seligman, 
supra note 369 (indicating that the A-10 could live on into the fiscal year of 2022).  
 372  See id. at 458–60 (discussing problems with Joint Strike Fighter acquisitions, which 
was “over budget and behind schedule”). 
 373 See id. at 116 (discussing the divides that the Secretary of Defense has to scale and the 
multiple interests that must be accounted for in each decision). 
 374 See id. at 458–60 (noting the different interests and authorities at play in the Joint 
Strike Fighter acquisition).  
 375 See 10 U.S.C. § 162(b) (setting forth the chain of command for the operational military 
to not include leadership of the administrative military).  
 376  See GATES, supra note 44, at 116–17 (discussing the dichotomy between incentive 
structures for command and administrative military personnel in decision making).  
 377  See Fallows, supra note 191, at 72 (arguing that many in Congress view military 
spending primarily as a way to bring jobs to their district).  
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Second, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’s frustrations 
in getting the administrative military to provide responsive and 
necessary equipment and weaponry to the operational military 
engaged in war-fighting.378 For example, upon a visit to the 
operational military, then-Secretary Gates saw firsthand the 
desperate need for soldiers in Afghanistan to receive Mine Resistant 
Armored Personnel (MRAP) carriers to protect their lives.379   
However, due to a quirk of Goldwater-Nichols, the Secretary of 
Defense must approve the transfer of all forces between combatant 
commands, regardless of their size or mission.380 Gates was 
increasingly frustrated with this process, which took too long and 
did not properly take into account the real-time force requirements 
of the operational military.381 Much to his dismay, Gates had to 
work creatively outside the existing force assignment system to 
ensure that the soldiers in the field received the equipment that 
they needed.382   
In sum, the Secretaries of the military departments (and 
Congress) are disproportionately focused on the long-term defense 
acquisitions process that addresses future threats at the expense of 
meeting current threats.383 The combatant commander receives 
forces from the individual services, but the services are not directly 
accountable for the type of equipment and personnel assigned.384 
This creates an administrative-operational disconnect in which the 
operational military’s real-time requirements are often out of sync 
with what is supplied by the administrative military, a fourth 
legacy of the two-military divide.  
 
 378 See GATES, supra note 44, at 121–22 (discussing Gates’s experience bridging the divide 
between the administrative and operational sides of the military).  
 379 See id. at 119–26 (discussing Gates’s perceptions about operational needs in 
Afghanistan).  
 380 See 10 U.S.C. § 162 (a)(3) (2012) (mandating that any force assigned to a combatant 
command may only by transferred from that command pursuant to the authority of the 
Secretary of Defense).  
 381 See GATES, supra note 44, at 117–18 (describing his frustration with the process).  
 382 See id. at 121–23 (outlining how Gates worked around the difficulties that Goldwater-
Nichols created to supply soldiers with MRAPs).  
 383 See MCINNIS, supra note 130, at 14 (quoting Secretary of Defense Robert Gates who 
stated that “[t]he Department of Defense is structured to plan and prepare for war, but not 
to fight one”). 
 384 See id. (discussing Gates’s personal reflections on the structural issues he experienced 
within the DoD).  
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V. THREE KEY FACTORS ACCELERATING AND EXACERBATING THE 
TWO-MILITARY DIVIDE 
In this Part, I identify and analyze the three additional factors 
that are exacerbating and accelerating the two-military divide. 
They include: (1) Congressional focus on the administrative military 
and the rise of the military-industrial-congressional complex; (2) the 
decline in veterans serving in Congress influencing operational 
military oversight; (3) and the tools of modern warfare that 
empower the operational military. 
A. THE TWO-MILITARY DIVIDE’S FIRST ACCELERANT: THE RISE OF THE 
MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL-CONGRESSIONAL COMPLEX 
In his 1961 Farewell Address, President Dwight Eisenhower 
famously warned of a “military-industrial complex.”385 Eisenhower, 
the Allied Commander in World War II, warned of the rise of a vast 
military organization and a persistent and powerful defense 
establishment whose interests were increasingly and inextricably 
linked with congressional interests.386 Noting that “[o]ur military 
organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my 
predecessors in peacetime,” President Eisenhower continued:  
 
[W]e have been compelled to create a permanent 
armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, 
three and a half million men and women are directly 
engaged in the defense establishment. We annually 
spend on military security more than the net income of 
all United States corporations . . . . In the councils of 
government, we must guard against the acquisition of 
unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by 
the military-industrial complex.387 
 
 
 385  See Military-Industrial Complex Speech, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1961, YALE LAW 
SCHOOL: THE AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/eisenhower001.asp 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
 386  Id. (“We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or 
democratic processes.”). 
 387  Id. (emphasis added).  
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Eisenhower lamented that he was unable to tame the military-
industrial complex during his tenure, “lay[ing] down [his] official 
responsibilities in this field with a definite sense of 
disappointment.”388 Today, the “military establishment [is] large 
enough to shape our dealings in the world and seriously influence 
our economy.”389  
Following World War II, the U.S. military did not shrink to a 
small peacetime size with the Soviet threat and dawn of the nuclear 
age. Despite Eisenhower’s warnings, the military-industrial 
complex endures and evolves.390 Today, Congress is intimately 
involved with the defense acquisition process, a core administrative 
military function.391 Eisenhower’s warnings about the military-
industrial complex can be more accurately described today as the 
military-industrial-congressional complex, as military expenditures 
are even more closely linked to jobs in congressional districts.392 
Following World War II, the defense industry became a major part 
of the U.S. economy.393 As a military-legal scholar has noted, 
“Congress [makes] defense decisions based on parochial, constituent 
interests rather than national concerns.”394  
As whole communities and congressional districts became 
dependent on military bases and local jobs that flow from the 
military-industrial-congressional complex, congressional interests 
and incentives became increasingly aligned with the administrative 
military’s authorities.395 Indeed, the actions of the civilian Service 
 
 388  Id. 
 389  Fallows, supra note 191. 
 390  President Eisenhower once famously quipped, “God help this country when someone 
sits in this chair who doesn’t know the military as well as I do.” MELVIN A. GOODMAN, 
NATIONAL INSECURITY: THE COST OF AMERICAN MILITARISM 193 (2013).  
 391  See Fallows, supra note 191 (discussing Congress’s efforts to bring military spending to 
their own districts).  
 392   See id. (“Political Engineering is the art of spreading a military project to as many 
congressional districts as possible, and thus maximizing the number of members of Congress 
who feel that if they cut off funding, they’d be hurting themselves.”). 
 393 See Louis Uchitelle, The U.S. Still Leans on the Military-Industrial Complex, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/22/business/economy/military-
industrial-complex.html (reporting that 10% of U.S. factory output is sold to the DoD).  
 394  Dunlap, supra note 125, at 379.  
 395  See infra Part IV.A.3. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to address this 
thoroughly, the explosion of campaign financial contributions has coincided with 
congressional involvement (and receipt of campaign contributions) from the defense industry. 
See, e.g., Clay Dillow, Defense Contractors Outgun Other Industries in Corporate PAC 
Donations, FORTUNE (Jul. 15, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/07/15/defense-contractors-pac/ 
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Secretaries and civilian defense acquisitions professionals are 
increasingly aligned; after all, the administrative military can win 
and lose jobs in congressional districts.396  
Despite the constitutional provision limiting Army 
appropriations to two years, it is now politically impractical for 
Congress to cut funding to military members (and their families).397 
Cuts do occur during the periodic Base Realignment and Closure 
(BRAC) process, but often only after bitter fights in the halls of 
Congress.398 After all, what may be good for the DoD may not be 
good for members of Congress and their constituents. For example, 
in 2010 then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates sought to save DoD 
funds by closing the Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, VA, an 
obsolete and duplicative military command.399 However, members 
of the Virginia congressional delegation fought Gates’s goal of 
shuttering the command at every turn as they saw jobs leaving their 
districts and their influence waning.400  
When looking at Congressional interests vis-à-vis the two 
militaries, the JSF again provides an instructive example of how 
the two-military divide informs and shapes the modern acquisitions 
process. As discussed in Part III, the Goldwater-Nichols Act heavily 
emphasized joint warfare throughout its statutory scheme, leading 
to a revolution in joint warfare and an increasing focus on 
interoperability among the three services.401 Defense contractors 
realize that “jointness” is the defining feature of the Goldwater-
 
(noting that defense industry PACs made up the majority portion of the top contributors to 
Congress in the first quarter of 2015).  
 396  See, e.g., Fallows, supra note 191 (“In the late 1980s, a coalition of so-called cheap hawks 
in Congress tried to cut the funding for the B-2 bomber. They got nowhere after it became 
clear that work for the project was being carried out in 46 states and no fewer than 383 
congressional districts (of 435 total).”).  
 397  See Rudesill, supra note 77, at 467–72 (providing several reasons why Congress cannot 
cut funding).   
 398  See, e.g., Eric Schmitt, States and Communities Battling Another Round of Base 
Closings, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/20/politics/states-
and-communities-battling-another-round-of-base-closings.html (stating that Congress 
created the base-closing process at the end of the Cold War and describing efforts by, among 
others, Governors Bush (FL) and Schwarzenegger (CA), to stave off significant funding cuts 
during the 2005 BRAC cycle).  
 399  See GATES, supra note 44, at 461–62 (discussing Gates’s decision to close the Norfolk-
based Joint Forces Command).  
 400  See id. at 461–62 (describing how the Virginia delegation “went wild” after the proposed 
closing announcement). 
 401  See supra Part III (discussing the Goldwater-Nichols legislation). 
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Nichols military, and the JSF is being manufactured against this 
backdrop across the three military branches that fly fixed-wing 
aircraft (Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps).402 
An enormously ambitious project, the total lifecycle cost for the 
purchase of the 2,000-plus JSF planes now exceeds $1.1 trillion.403 
Likely cognizant that the manufacture of this massively expensive 
weapon would receive great scrutiny and interest from Congress, 
the manufacturer (Lockheed Martin) of the JSF placed the location 
of its various parts throughout nearly all 50 states and across even 
more congressional districts.404  
Shrewdly marketed and manufactured, the JSF has proven too 
big to fail. While the JSF has been the subject of numerous 
investigations, cost overruns, and criticisms concerning its safety 
and operational effectiveness, its manufacture continues apace.405 
Members of Congress, in turn, can point to “victories” in their 
respective districts—manufacturing jobs that bolster their 
individual standing and re-election bids. In a rare moment of 
bipartisanship, Democratic and Republican members of Congress 
even established a “Joint Strike Fighter Caucus” in an effort to 
protect the JSF from budget cuts.406 
The rise of the military-industrial-congressional complex and its 
corresponding incentive structure has led to strange military-
congressional bedfellows. For example, Senator Bernie Sanders (I-
VT) can fairly be described as skeptical of both the operational 
 
 402  See Christian Davenport, Under Trump, the F-35’s Costs, More Than $1 Trillion Over 
60 Years, Continues to Draw Scrutiny, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/12/08/under-trump-the-f-35s-
costs-more-than-1-trillion-over-60-years-continue-to-draw-
scrutiny/?utm_term=.ca7416ffdd3a (“The F-35 comes in three variants, one each for the Air 
Force, the Navy and the Marines . . . .”). 
 403  See id. (noting that the project is projected to top $1 trillion over its 60-year life-span).  
 404  See Daniel Bukszpan, Why Bernie Sanders is Backing a $1.5 Trillion Military 
Boondoggle, CNBC (Jul. 12, 2016, 9:52 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/12/why-bernie-
sanders-is-backing-a-15-trillion-military-boondoggle.html (noting that 45 states and Puerto 
Rico are involved in the production of the aircraft). 
 405  See Davenport, supra note 402 (noting billions of dollars in cost overruns and years of 
delays caused by technical difficulties).  
 406  See T.W. Farnam, Caucus Forms to Save the F-35 From Budget Cuts, WASH. POST (Nov. 
23, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/caucus-forms-to-save-the-f-35-from-
budget-cuts/2011/11/22/gIQA6QDupN_story.html?utm_term=.32f9d2f05d9a (describing the 
caucus formation and membership, specifically noting the location of Lockheed Martin’s main 
airline-assembly plant in one of the caucus co-founder’s districts).  
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military’s role in U.S. national security and defense spending more 
generally.407 But he has been a consistent and reliable booster of the 
JSF, irrespective of escalating costs.408 Vermont has benefitted from 
this military largesse toward the JSF; Lockheed Martin established 
a manufacturing plant outside of Burlington, bringing thousands of 
jobs to Vermont.409 Additionally, Vermont is the first state 
scheduled to receive the new JSFs, with a shipment slated for the 
Vermont Air National Guard in 2019.410 Senator Sanders has 
clearly taken notice of these developments and has consistently 
voted for Vermont jobs and jets.411 
B. THE TWO-MILITARY DIVIDE’S SECOND ACCELERANT: THE DECLINE 
IN FIRSTHAND CONGRESSIONAL MILITARY EXPERIENCE412  
Second, the dramatic decrease in the number of veterans serving 
in Congress has further accelerated the two-military divide’s effects. 
The military is an increasingly independent institution in both 
perception and practice that is further removed from civil society.413 
The discontinuation of the draft in 1973 ended compulsory military 
service.414 Military service is no longer a shared societal experience 
in the age of an all-volunteer force.415  In addition, congressional 
military experience and oversight of military matters have fallen to 
 
 407  See Bukszpan, supra note 404 (describing Sanders’s relatively dovish military policy 
proposals).  
 408  See id. (noting Sanders’s continued support for the program).  
 409  See id. (describing the 1,400 jobs created in Chittenden County as a result of the F-35 
program).  
 410  See Jess Aloe, F-35 in Vermont: The Economic Footprint, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS 
(Sept. 14, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/story/news/2018/09/14/f-35-
jet-vermont-economic-footprint-air-national-guard/1041153002/ (discussing when the Guard 
will receive a shipment of the FSJs).  
 411  See Bukszpan, supra note 404 (restating some of Sanders’s comments about the 
program’s benefits for the state of Vermont). 
 412  For a wider discussion of the methodology of this study, see Danielle L. Lupton, Out of 
the Service, Into the House: Military Experience and Congressional War Oversight, 70 POL. 
RES. Q. 327 (Jan. 2017). 
 413  See BROOKS, supra note 11, at 14 (“[T]he U.S. military itself—as a human institution—
has grown more and more sharply delineated from the broader society . . . .”). 
 414  See David E. Rosenbaum, Nation Ends Draft, Turns to Volunteers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 
1973), https://www.nytimes.com/1973/01/28/archives/nation-ends-draft-turns-to-volunteers-
message-from-laird-hopes.html (noting the end of the draft in January 1973).  
 415  See David Auerswald & Colton Campbell, Introduction, in CONGRESS IN CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS 202 (2015) (observing a trend in the United States “where the volunteer military 
is increasingly disconnected from the average American”). 
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historic lows. For example, Goldwater-Nichols was passed when 
military service in both congressional chambers was near 70%.416 
Now, it has plummeted to below 20%, and this decline has led to 
oversight ramifications.417  The rise of the operational military has 
coincided with a decrease in congressional standing and trust as a 
public institution; in contrast, the military remains one of the few 
public institutions that enjoys a favorable standing in the eyes of 
the American public. A recent Gallup poll showed that 72% of people 
had “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the military but 
only 12% of the population felt the same about Congress.418 
Congress, in turn, has been overly deferential in operational 
military matters.419 
Recent political science research has begun to shine light on the 
consequences of this decrease in the number of veterans in Congress 
for voting patterns and oversight over operational military 
matters.420 Two statistically significant voting trends are emerging. 
First, members of Congress with military experience were more 
likely to vote to increase congressional access to information during 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.421 This trend is intuitive. Veteran 
members of Congress—regardless of political party or gender—will 
better understand the type of information necessary to wage war, 
contextualize it accordingly, and not excessively defer to the 
 
 416  See Mary Jordan, After Iraq and Afghanistan, Pioneering Women in the Military Set 
Sights on Congress, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
2018/02/07/237865a2-fad7-11e7-8f66-2df0b94bb98a_story.html?utm_term=.76efdf93b911 
(“In the 1980s, more than 70 percent of House and Senate members had served in the 
military.”).  
 417  See Lupton, supra note 412, at 331–32 (discussing the drop in Congress members who 
have served in the military); see also Jordan, supra note 416 (noting that in 2018 about 20% 
of Congress members had served in the military).  
 418  See Jordan, supra note 416 (discussing the Gallup polls of confidence regarding the 
military and Congress).  
 419  See Kohn, supra note 246, at 17 (explaining the deference military officials feel in 
operational decision-making).  
 420  See Danielle Lupton, Having Fewer Veterans in Congress Makes it Less Likely to 
Restrain the President’s Use of Force, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/11/10/fewer-veterans-serve-in-
congress-every-term-that-makes-congress-less-likely-to-rein-in-the-presidents-use-of-
force/?utm_term=.a9a5f427634f (discussing Lupton’s research on voting patterns and 
operational oversight by Congress).  
 421   Id.  
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military.422 Veterans in Congress are more likely to ask the right 
questions and not give military leadership a pass.423 Second, 
members of Congress with military experience are more likely to 
limit the use of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, limit their 
redeployment to an operational theater, and exercise control over 
American military personnel in a combat theater.424  
Goldwater-Nichols was passed during a time of relatively high 
levels of firsthand military experience in Congress.425 Those days 
are long gone and, absent a draft, those numbers are not returning. 
These early political science findings have implications for war 
termination, further accelerating the decline in civilian control of 
the operational military.426  
Congress’s lack of familiarity with operational military matters 
should not be confused with a lack of interest. Consider the recent 
operational military tragedy in Niger, where four special operations 
forces were tragically killed in an operation largely out of sight of 
the American people.427 The existence of troops in Africa caught 
many Americans—and foreign policy experts in Congress—off-
guard.428 Many senior members of Congress with military oversight 
responsibilities professed ignorance of the very existence of military 
troops in Niger and neighboring African countries.429 But the 
existence of these troops should have come as no surprise. After all, 
Africa Command is the newest geographic combatant command and 
 
 422  See id.  (arguing this thesis to explain the data on voting patterns discussed); see also 
Auerswald & Campbell, supra note 415, at 4 (explaining that civilians do not easily 
understand military operations compared to veterans). 
 423 See Lupton, supra note 412, at 333–36 (discussing veteran Congress members’ general 
scrutiny on military issues and policy).  
 424  See id. (noting the general trends in veteran Congress members’ voting on military 
policy and issues).  
 425  See Jordan, supra note 416  (noting the percentage of veterans in Congress overtime).  
 426  See Lupton, supra note 420, at 333–36 (arguing the effects of this decrease in veteran 
representation in Congress). 
 427  See James G. Meek, U.S. Soldiers killed in Niger were outgunned, ‘Left Behind’ in Hunt 
for ISIS Leader, ABC NEWS (May 3, 2018, 1:05 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/International/us-
soldiers-killed-niger-outgunned-left-hunt-isis/story?id=54909240 (stating that four special 
operations soldiers were killed); see Searcy & Schmitt, supra note 42, at A5 (explaining that 
congressmen did not know of troops in Niger).  
 428  See Searcey & Schmitt, supra note 42, at A5 (“The United States has about 800 service 
members in Niger, yet the scale of its military operations there surprised even two high-
ranking senators . . . .”). 
 429  See id. 
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has been fully operational since 2008.430 Military operations in 
Africa have steadily increased since that time.431 The Pentagon has 
also consistently maintained that Congress was appropriately 
informed in accordance with the War Powers Resolution.432  
C. THE TOOLS OF MODERN WARFARE FURTHER EMPOWER THE 
OPERATIONAL MILITARY  
Finally, the remarkable tools of modern warfare further 
empower the operational military at the expense of civilian 
oversight. Today, these operational military commanders—often 
out of sight and far removed from the American public—
increasingly possess the awesome legal authority to utilize all the 
tools of modern warfare.433 Military and Executive Branch officials 
increasingly favor utilizing all the tools of modern warfare including 
cyber warfare, special operations forces, and drones.434   
The rise of special operations forces illustrates this trend.435 
SOCOM is the very embodiment of the operational military, with 
special training and amplified operational legal authorities.436 
Increasingly SOF operates pursuant to covert action authorities, 
 
 430  See About the Command, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND, https://www.africom.mil/about-the-
command (last visited Feb. 23, 2019) (explaining that African Command started initial 
operations in 2007 and became fully operational in 2008).  
 431  See, e.g., Eric Schewe, Why is the U.S. Military Occupying Bases Across Africa?, JSTOR: 
DAILY (April 11, 2018), https://daily.jstor.org/why-is-the-u-s-military-occupying-bases-across-
africa/ (suggesting that involvement in Africa has increased since President Bush’s 
administration and that it continues today).  
 432  See, e.g., Alice Friend, DoD’s Report on the Investigation into the 2017 Ambush in Niger, 
CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUD. (May 15, 2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/dods-
report-investigation-2017-ambush-niger (stating that the Trump administration maintains 
it can continue operations in Niger because of War Powers notifications).  
 433  See, e.g., David E. Sanger, Pentagon Puts Cyberwarriors on the Offensive, Increasing the 
Risk of Conflict, N. Y. TIMES (June 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/17/
us/politics/cyber-command-trump.html (explaining that the United States has switched from 
a defensive to offensive position with cyber-attacks); W.J. Hennigan, The New American Way 
of War, TIME (Nov. 30, 2017), http://time.com/5042700/inside-new-american-way-of-war/ 
(describing the widespread use of special operations); Ken Dilanian & Courtney Kube, Trump 
Administration Wants to Increase CIA Drone Strikes, NBC NEWS (Sep. 18, 2017) 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/military/trump-admin-wants-increase-cia-drone-strikes-
n802311 (reasoning that Trump plans to expand the use of drones for airstrikes). 
 434  Id. 
 435  See Hennigan, supra note 433 (“Name a country in the world’s most volatile regions and 
it is likely that Special Operations forces are deployed there).  
 436  See 10 U.S.C. § 167 (2012) (giving special operations the power to train and other 
generally broad powers). 
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secret operations where Congress and the American people may 
never be notified of their occurrence.437 Elite, well-trained, 
possessing a “light footprint,” and incredibly effective, special 
operators have become the darling of Congress and the Executive 
Branch with a corresponding massive increase in budget in recent 
years.438 The public, too, has become enamored with their exploits, 
fueled by Hollywood films and media stories about their heroism.439 
Clearly, special forces are a brilliant tactical tool. However, their 
widespread (and possibly excessive) use as the military tool of choice 
raises fundamental concerns about how the U.S. goes to war and 
conducts operations. The widespread employment of special 
operations forces since 9/11 (often unknown to the American people) 
helps avoid broader discussions of the number of “boots on the 
ground” in a particular conflict that could raise questions about how 
the U.S. military is employing its forces overseas.440  
The Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols Act 
established SOCOM.441 It is a unique functional combatant 
command in that it also possesses awesome operational military 
authorizations and additional administrative military 
authorities.442 It is not limited by geographic boundaries.443 And it 
is no exaggeration to state that special operations forces operate 
nearly everywhere—at last count they were in 137 nations.444  
Despite being a small fraction of the military at just 5%, they now 
 
 437  See 50 U.S.C. § 3093(e) (2012) (defining “covert action”); see generally, SEAN NAYLOR, 
RELENTLESS STRIKE: THE SECRET HISTORY OF JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (2015) 
(discussing the rise of Joint Special Operations Command). 
 438  See Todd South, Special Operations Command Asks for More Troops, Biggest Budget 
Yet, MIL. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2018), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-
army/2018/02/23/special-operations-command-asks-for-more-troops-biggest-budget-yet/ 
(stating that between fiscal year 2017 and fiscal year 2018, the special operations budget 
increased from 11.8 billion to 12.6 billion dollars.).  
 439  See, e.g., ZERO DARK THIRTY (Columbia 2012) (depicting the special operation to kill 
Osama Bin Laden). 
 440  See Hennigan, supra note 433 (noting that special forces have become “an alternative 
to sending thousands of conventional military forces to hot spots and risking the political 
blowback”).  
 441  See 10 U.S.C. § 167 (2012) (establishing special operations). 
 442  See id. (describing the powers given to special operations). 
 443  See id. (describing the powers of combatant command without mentioning geography); 
see also JOINT PUBLICATION 1, supra note 56, at II (describing worldwide goals). 
 444  See Turse, supra note 41 (stating that special operations are deployed in seventy percent 
of the world and have been deployed to 137 countries in 2017).  
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account for the majority of casualties.445 Because of their stealth, 
lethality, and expertise, special operations forces are increasingly 
the tools of choice for Executive Branch officials.446 SOCOM’s 
activities are often cloaked in secrecy and occur outside the United 
States.447 Special operations often operate in so called “gray zone” 
conflicts pursuant to covert action authorities that are often out of 
sight of the American public.448 But is Congress attempting to reign 
in or otherwise examine the widespread use of special operations in 
light of this dramatic shift in the nature of warfare? No.449  
Congress has facilitated the rise of SOCOM by routinely 
increasing SOCOM’s role and expanding its budget.450 It has also 
seen an expansion of legal authorities where all active and reserve 
special operations forces stationed in the United States are assigned 
to SOCOM, creating what has been described as a “fifth branch of 
the military” to complement the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast 
Guard.451 Not only do special operations forces enjoy dual 
operational and administrative authorities, they increasingly 
operate pursuant to both title 10 and title 50 (covert action) 
authorities, providing the President with remarkable lethality, 
flexibility, and a truncated decision-making process.452 Because of 
these dual command authorities, SOCOM may be fairly described 
 
 445  See Hennigan, supra note 433 (stating that special operations forces comprise almost 
all casualties despite only being 5% of military forces).  
 446  See, e.g., id. (“Obama had shifted the burden of the fight against the insurgencies to 
commandos.”).  
 447  See Searcey & Schmitt, supra note 42, at A5 (noting that Congress has little insight into 
how special operations forces are used).  
 448  See 50 U.S.C. § 3093(e) (2012) (“‘[C]overt action’ means an activity or activities of the 
United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, 
where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or 
acknowledged publicly. . . .” (emphasis added)); see Robert Chesney, Military-Intelligence 
Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate, 5 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 539–54 
(2012) (describing the conflict between Title 10 and Title 50 and the implications on public 
knowledge). 
 449  But see 10 U.S.C. § 130(f) (2012) (requiring that Congress be informed of military 
operations under certain circumstances); Rudesill, supra note 77, at 64 (asserting that the 
DoD “increasingly reports to Congress about such operations in a manner that begins to 
approach the covert action process”).  
 450  See ANDREW FEICKERT, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., RS21048, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
FORCES (SOF): BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1–2 (updated October 29, 2018) 
(outlining changes in special operations over the past years). 
 451  See 10 U.S.C. § 167(b) (2012) (stating how assignments of reserve members will occur).  
 452  See Chesney, supra note 448, at 539–40, 601–02 (discussing presidential power within 
the context of the emerging trend of convergence in military operations). 
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as a “super combatant-command.”453 Within SOCOM, the executive 
branch increasingly uses Joint Special Operations Command 
(JSOC) for the most dangerous missions; its truncated chain of 
command, expertise, lethality, and overall effectiveness is 
legendary.454 In addition, while all agencies are delegated authority 
from Congress, the DoD delegates internally from the President as 
Commander in Chief to lower tactical commanders.455 These 
delegations have been primarily focused on providing increased 
authority to the operational military commanders, which often 
involves the loosening of the rules of engagement.456  
In sum, if civilian control of the military is better understood as 
a process, Congress should continue to play a more meaningful role 
in this process. The Legislative Branch serves as the connective 
tissue between the military and citizenry. However, Congress is 
largely absent from existing core processes including the 
operational military’s creation and design as set forth by the UCP 
plan and the yearly NDAA budget process where Congress focuses 
disproportionately on administrative military matters.457 The lack 
of firsthand congressional military experience that influences 
voting in operational military matters further exacerbates this 
absence. Meanwhile, the operational military’s power and influence 
continues to grow without comparable oversight.  
  
 
 453  See id. (discussing the difficulties arising between title 10 and title 50); see also JOINT 
PUBLICATION 1, supra note 56, at III-6, III-7 (“[SOCOM] is unique among the [Combatant 
Commands] in that it performs Service-like functions [to] organize, train, equip, and provide 
combat-ready SOF to the other [Combatant Commands] . . . .”).  
 454 See Chesney, supra note 448, at 574–75 (describing JSOC’s rise in the post-911 era). 
 455 See supra Part III.A.  
 456 See id. at 540 (demonstrating how increased convergence of military operations blurs 
the lines of acceptable conduct under the rules leading to less accountability).  
 457  See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.  
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS TO REMEDY THE TWO-MILITARY DIVIDE’S 
EFFECTS 
A. IMPROVING CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY AND 
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT WITH A NEW MODEL FOR NATIONAL 
SECURITY GOVERNANCE  
Goldwater-Nichols, passed in the aftermath of military tragedy, 
was in many ways a stunning success. It improved war-fighting, 
empowered operational military commanders, diminished inter-
service rivalry, and centralized the way the President and civilian 
military leadership received military advice.458  
However, its legacy is mixed, and its ambitions overshot in many 
important respects. At its core, Goldwater-Nichols is a Cold War 
statute designed for a far different time. The world has changed 
dramatically since the law’s passage in 1986, and the military is 
becoming an increasingly independent institution further removed 
from the American citizenry that it is sworn to protect.459 
Goldwater-Nichols empowered the operational combatant 
commanders in invisible or unintended ways; the result is to 
weaken civilian control of the operational military and create an 
enduring two-military bureaucracy.460 The law incentivized 
congressional focus on administrative matters at the expense of 
operational ones, accelerating the two-military divide—and despite 
its stated objective, it failed to rein in the massively inefficient 
administrative bureaucracy and expensive acquisitions process.461  
It remains unclear whether members of Congress understand the 
scope and scale of institutional executive drift, despite some 
hopeful, initial steps by ranking members (themselves veterans) of 
 
 458  See infra Part III (discussing Goldwater-Nichols).  
 459  See Yoo, supra note 256, at 2283–92 (discussing the military’s growing independence 
from political leadership since the end of World War II). It is also becoming increasingly 
outdated, as was evidenced by James Lochner’s statement that “[t]he typical 20th century 
organization has not operated well in a rapidly changing environment. Structure, systems, 
practices, and culture have often been more of a drag on change than a facilitator. If 
environmental volatility continues to increase, as most people now predict, the standard 
organization of the 20th century will likely become a dinosaur.” Goldwater-Nichols Hearings, 
supra note 15, at 5–6 (statement of James Locher). 
 460  See supra Part IV. 
 461  See James R. Locher III, Has it Worked?—The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act, 
54 NAVAL WAR COLL. REV. 95, 95–96, 111–12 (2001) (examining the changes instituted by the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act and assessing whether they have worked). 
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the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) to revise Goldwater-
Nichols 30 years after its passage.462 Indeed, the time is right for a 
third major national security act to complement and partially 
replace the National Security Act and Goldwater-Nichols Act. This 
new act should first take an honest assessment of how the military 
functions across the world and address the operational military’s 
ever-expanding foreign relations and non-military functions. 
Lawmakers should acknowledge that the expanding definition of 
“national security” should not default to military solutions.463 
Today, other agencies (USAID, State) play an increasingly 
important role in national security governance and decision-
making, but their budgets (and influence) are waning.464 While all 
agencies now compete with one another for personnel and funding, 
the DoD is by far the largest agency at 3.2 million people and a 
budget in excess of $680 billion a year.465  
This Part presents recommendations to increase congressional 
oversight and to update the Goldwater-Nichols Act for the twenty-
first century. After 9/11, Congress passed the comprehensive 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act that reformed 
the intelligence community and established the Secretary of 
Homeland Security as a Cabinet-level official.466 Yet no such act 
emerged to address DoD's governing legal architecture. The 
Goldwater-Nichols Act remains largely unchanged from its Cold 
War origins. And despite calls for defense reform, it remains intact. 
Concerns about the derogation of civilian control of the military 
are more important and timelier than ever. At the time of this 
writing, there are just two civilians providing executive branch 
 
 462  See generally Goldwater-Nichols Hearings, supra note 15. 
 463  National security is not defined in law, but is defined by DoD in joint doctrine. Its 
capacious definition includes “[a] collective term encompassing both national defense and 
foreign relations of the United States with the purpose of gaining . . . [a] military or defense 
advantage over any foreign nation . . . [a] favorable foreign relations position . . . [a] defense 
posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, 
overt or covert.” DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 162.  
 464  See generally OFFICE MGMT. & BUDGET, AN AMERICAN BUDGET: BUDGET OF THE U.S. 
GOVERNMENT (2019) (detailing each department’s and agencies’ budget for the fiscal year 
2019 as well as the goals for this year’s budget).  
 465  See id. (noting the changes in commands and overseas operations for the fiscal year); 
see also McCarthy, supra note 26 (discussing the DoD’s large employment power). 
 466  See generally Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 
108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004) (citing its purposes as the reform of the intelligence community 
and its related activities).  
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oversight over the operational military: President Trump and acting 
Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan. And the President has shown 
an increased willingness to delegate more authority to operational 
military commanders in the field, at times loosening rules of 
engagement while delegating responsibilities to his military 
operational commanders.467 Money continues to flow to the DoD as 
one of the few federal agencies receiving funding increases.468 
A new national security law should address the complex 
international security environment through the establishment of a 
more holistic government approach to complex international 
security issues. A more balanced and interagency-focused 
Goldwater-Nichols would better integrate other agencies into the 
national security apparatus. What Goldwater-Nichols did for 
“jointness” in bringing the different services together,469 a new law 
can do for an interagency national security apparatus. Consider the 
following five ideas. 
First, we are simply asking too much from one person, the 
Secretary of Defense, to referee disputes between the 
administrative and operational militaries as well as civilian and 
military leadership. Within the operational military’s chain of 
command there is just one level of civilian oversight (the Secretary 
of Defense) before reaching the Commander in Chief.470 In contrast, 
the administrative military has two levels of oversight, ensuring an 
additional “civilian buffer.”471 One immediate, logical step is to 
simply require a commensurate amount of civilian control across 
both militaries. If three civilians oversee the administrative 
military, why should two civilians be responsible for operational 
military oversight? To remedy this, a new law should create a 
civilian “combatant commander secretary” to help oversee the 
military combatant commands and operational military. This would 
 
 467  See Helene Cooper, Trump Gives Military New Freedom, but With That Comes Danger, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2017, at A12 (suggesting that a new command style may increase the 
potential for civilian casualties). 
 468  See OFFICE MGMT. & BUDGET, AN AMERICAN BUDGET: BUDGET OF THE U.S. 
GOVERNMENT, supra note 464 (discussing the budget for military activities). 
 469  See discussion supra Part III (noting the strengths of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 
fostering more unity in the military).  
 470  See 10 U.S.C. § 113 (2012) (setting forth the role the Secretary of Defense).  
 471  See discussion supra Part III (arguing that Goldwater-Nichols further allowed for the 
administrative military to have far more oversight than the operational military).  
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provide an equal level of civilian oversight of both militaries, freeing 
up the Secretary of Defense to delegate certain oversight authorities 
to these combatant command officials.  
This would provide several advantages and would obviate any 
perception that the Secretaries of the military departments provide 
some modicum of control over operational military matters. Ideally, 
the civilian combatant command secretary would be a senior official 
with deep foreign policy experience and relationships within a 
particular geographic area. He or she could guide the military 
combatant commander as the military combatant commander 
learns the Area of Responsibility (AOR). Oftentimes, the military 
combatant commander was never stationed in that particular part 
of the world and faces a steep learning curve with regards to the 
area’s language, culture, and regional dynamics. And there is 
precedent for such a role: we recognized the importance of having 
senior diplomats in both Iraq and Afghanistan during major combat 
operations with the appointment of Ambassador Ryan Crocker to 
Iraq and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to Afghanistan.472  
Alternatively, co-equal ambassadors or foreign policy experts 
could be incorporated into the operational military’s command to 
guide and assist the geographic combatant commanders. This is an 
intermediate step to help ensure a more holistic, integrated 
government approach to foreign policy. These co-equal ambassadors 
should be placed directly in the chain of command and staffed 
accordingly. This would help ensure continuity and a cohesive 
diplomatic/military voice in international relations.  
Taking this first step adds an additional layer of civilian control 
of the military, mirroring the administrative military. It also 
ensures foreign policy expertise and a non-military voice on complex 
international relations and foreign policy matters.  It is also a frank 
acknowledgment that the military is called upon to do numerous 
missions, not because they have the expertise, but because they are 
there. Too often this leads to military solutions for non-military 
 
 472  See Scott Shane, Ryan Clark Crocker, a Diplomat Used to Danger, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/06/world/middleeast/06crocker.html (discussing 
Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker appointment to Iraq); see also Robert D. McFadden, Strong 
American Voice in Diplomacy and Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2010), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/14/world/14holbrooke.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh
=CFFD0B5B1A2D73E0C6F2DE24F79AD423&gwt=pay (discussing Ambassador Richard 
Holbrooke and his appointment).  
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problems. If you are a hammer, complex national security problems 
too often appear as nails. And that hammer is only getting bigger.473 
This is also a realistic, rational step to help counteract the massive 
budgetary discrepancy between the DoD and other national 
security-related agencies.  
Second, the combatant commands, Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, State Department, and intelligence community all lack an 
aligned geographic framework for defining the regions of the world. 
Why? Too often they are, literally, not on the same page (or map).474 
Even the Office of the Secretary of Defense is organized differently 
than the Unified Command Plan.475 This unnecessarily handicaps 
policy development and integration across the government. One 
agency zigs while the other zags. As national security governance 
requires tools of diplomacy, intelligence, military, and economics, 
there should be one, single aligned national security and foreign 
policy “map” that integrates all critical actors and takes advantage 
of the power of alignment. 
Third, we should strongly consider providing a more formalized 
mechanism for dissent and take steps to decentralize the military 
advice that is given to the President, Security of Defense, and 
National Security Council. Centralization and unification has 
advantages, but it also comes with costs.476 Under Goldwater-
Nichols, military advice is now transmitted via one person, the 
CJCS.477 While each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Army, 
 
 473  See Cooper, supra 467 (discussing the military’s new freedom under the Trump 
administration).  
  474   For example, the combatant commands have six geographic combatant commands 
(Northern, Southern, Africa, Europe, Pacific, and Central) while the State Department has 
six different regions (Africa, Europe and Eurasia, Near East, Western Hemisphere, East Asia 
and Pacific, and South Asia), and the CIA Intelligence Directorate has five (Asia Pacific, Latin 
America, Africa, Near East and South Asia, and Russia and Europe). See MURDOCK ET AL., 
supra note 35, at 37–38 (recommending the creation of a “common regional framework” across 
the U.S. government). 
 475  See id. at 37 n.28 (“The Office of the Secretary of Defense divides the world into four 
regions: Africa, Asia and Pacific, Near East and South Asia, and Western Hemisphere.”).  
 476  See POSNER, supra note 226, at 42–43 (noting the difficulties of transmitting intelligence 
information in a centralized structure). 
 477  See 10 U.S.C. § 151(d) (2012) (setting guidelines for communicating opinions of members 
other than the Chairman). 
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Navy, Air Force, Marines) may submit a matter in dissent, that 
opinion is transmitted via the CJCS, who submits his own advice.478  
Unlike the other members of the Joint Staff, the CJCS has 
several advantages. First, he is widely recognized as the senior 
military officer in the DoD, affording him a special status as “first 
among equals” as the face of the military to the media and American 
public.479 Second, the CJCS is focused on operational military 
matters and lacks administrative responsibilities such as staffing, 
training, and equipping that are the outsized focus of the 
administrative military leadership.480 Finally, the Chairman’s Joint 
Staff may be the most effective staff in government, and the staff is 
predominantly composed of active-duty military forces.481 Day to 
day, the Chairman and his staff only serve the operational military 
and the operational chain of command,482 potentially undermining 
the important role of the civilian Office of the Secretary of Defense. 
A revised Goldwater-Nichols should authorize a legal mechanism 
for the top civilian leaders to hear a wide variety of voices across the 
services and provide mechanisms for dissent. This would have the 
additional benefit of providing a more direct linkage between the 
operational military and administrative military. 
Fourth, we should review and overhaul the national security 
budgetary process. The National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA) funds the DoD,483 while a separate funding process exists 
for the other national security agencies (e.g. State, USAID, 
Homeland Security).484 While Congress often focuses on 
administrative matters within the NDAA, it does receive a baseline 
 
 478  See id. (“A member . . . may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion . . . [which] 
the Chairman shall present . . . at the same time he presents his own advice. . . .”).  
 479  See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 
https://www.jcs.mil/About/the-Joint-Staff/chairman/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2019) (recognizing 
the “Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff as the senior ranking member of the Armed Forces”).  
 480  See MURDOCK ET AL., supra note 35, at 24 (noting that the Chairman’s chief 
responsibilities are operational in nature).  
 481  See About the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, https://www.jcs.mil/About/ 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2019) (noting that the Joint Chiefs of Staff consists of at least one 
representative from each of the branches of military—Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, 
and National Guard).  
 482  See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supra note 479 (noting that the Chairman 
and his staff “transmit communications to the combatant commands”).  
 483  See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
 484  See MURDOCK ET AL., supra note 35, at 34, 42 (noting the inconsistencies in budgeting 
processes across individual agencies and pointing out the need for interagency budgeting).  
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of congressional attention every year. A massive monetary infusion 
in USAID and State is unlikely anytime soon, but they clearly play 
a critical (albeit diminished role) in responding to national security 
crisis. Why not integrate State and USAID funding into the existing 
NDAA process? Alternatively, the NDAA could include an 
operational/foreign policy section that integrates the budgets for the 
core national security agencies or reinvigorate the Office of 
Management and Budget’s role in refereeing national security 
priorities. 
Fifth, the administrative military should be accountable to the 
operational military for the equipment, weapons, and personnel 
that it provides to the commanders in the field. Put simply, the DoD 
and administrative military “is structured to plan and prepare for 
war, but not to fight one.”485 A revised Goldwater-Nichols should 
mandate a synchronization cell with command and control 
authority to ensure that the administrative military is responsive 
in real time to the requirements of the operational military. At this 
time, this is done via the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
(JROC), but this entity lacks full legal authority to ensure 
oversight.486 
Finally, while there are signs that Congress might take a fresh 
look at Goldwater-Nichols with the potential of breathing new life 
into legislative oversight, more must be done. In 2016, Senators 
McCain (R-AZ) and Reed (D-RI) held bipartisan hearings on the 
need for a new Goldwater-Nichols Act, but future legislation 
remains uncertain.487 Any legislative change should focus on 
breathing life into legislative oversight of the operational military, 
addressing the core unintended consequence of the Goldwater-
Nichols Act. This includes members of Congress taking a greater 
role in the combatant commanders’ budget process and developing 
a better understanding of their roles in foreign policy. Right now, 
the geographic combatant commanders are required to brief 
 
 485  See MCINNIS, supra note 130, at 14 (quoting former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates).  
 486  See 10 U.S.C. § 181 (2012) (describing mission and composition the JROC).  
 487  See Sen. McCain Issues Opening Statement at Hearing on Defense Budget Request for 
FY 2017, TARGETED NEWS SERV., Mar. 17, 2016 (quoting Sen. John McCain) (“[A]nother 
priority of this Committee will remain the defense reform effort that we began last year, 
including a review of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation that is now marking its thirtieth 
anniversary.”).  
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Congress once a year.488 In light of their already robust role in 
foreign policy and statecraft, they should be required to brief 
congressional leaders semi-annually.  
And Congress should be actively engaged in exercising its 
investigatory power to better understand where combatant 
commanders are requesting forces to be deployed throughout the 
world—particularly special operations forces.  This is particularly 
important for areas that are seeing an increased American force 
presence (Philippines, Africa, Southeast Asia).489 Too often, 
Congress appears to be caught off-guard about these operations.490 
With a continual Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) in 
place and a NDAA passed every year, combatant commanders 
possess the legal and fiscal authority to conduct a wide range of 
missions outside the public eye.491 Congress should be better 
informed and engaged on these missions. 
B. REFORMING THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT TO BETTER 
REFLECT MILITARY ORGANIZATIONAL REALITIES  
As discussed in Part IV, the APA is no longer aligned with the 
organizational realities of the two-military state. The APA was 
passed just one year before the National Security Act and forty 
years prior to Goldwater-Nichols and remains antiquated as applied 
to the modern military.492 As a general matter, most administrative 
military actions that occur within the United States remain subject 
 
 488  See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 489  See Brad Lendon, China’s reaction to U.S. Navy Operation: We Have Missiles, CNN (Jan. 
10, 2019, 8:03 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/10/asia/china-missiles-south-china-sea-
intl/index.html (noting Chinese displeasure with U.S. Naval presence in South China Sea); 
Greg Myre, The Military Doesn’t Advertise It, But U.S. Troops Are All Over Africa, NPR (Apr. 
28, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018/04/28/605662771/the-military-doesnt-
advertise-it-but-u-s-troops-are-all-over-africa (noting the U.S. presence in Africa extends 
across roughly 20 African countries). 
 490  See, e.g., Daniella Diaz, Key Senators Say They Didn’t Know the U.S. Had Troops in 
Niger, CNN (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/23/politics/niger-troops-
lawmakers/index.html (“‘I did not,’ Sen. Bob Casey, D-Pennsylvania, responded to CNN’s 
Chris Cuomo on ‘New Day’ Monday whether he knew there were troops in Niger.”). 
 491  See supra Part III (noting how the operational military has been granted broader war-
making authority at the expense of congressional oversight). 
 492   See supra Part IV.C. 
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to the APA while most operational military actions taken by 
combatant commands are not subject to the APA.493  
First, the definition of “agency” should be updated. Specifically, 
the APA is silent on how administrative law should address actions 
taken by combatant commanders. Both the Secretaries of the 
military departments and combatant commands are one step below 
the Secretary of Defense in the DoD hierarchy, but only the 
Secretaries of the military departments are “agencies” within the 
plain meaning of the APA.494  
Second, the APA exemptions should be reformed to eliminate 
“the time of war” exemption to more precisely address the military 
activities that take place in peace and the expanding menu of 
actions short of war. For example, the operational military does 
conduct certain “gray area” activities that are neither purely 
administrative nor operational.495 Both the United States Navy and 
Coast Guard conduct a wide range of activities on the high seas and 
outside the United States that may be fairly described as 
“readiness” activities that are hard to clearly define and are not 
purely wartime activities.496 As operational activities, however, they 
currently fall outside the APA’s jurisdiction.  
The military function exception should also be updated and 
defined more precisely. Rulemaking and adjudications that involve 
“the conduct of military or foreign affairs functions” are exempt.497 
Notice of a proposed rule, opportunity for public comment, and 
publication of the final rule are central to administrative law.  
Courts have struggled to determine what, exactly, is a military 
function, applying the military function exemption to the creation 
of temporary security zones498 and to the determination of death of 
 
 493  Compare Story v. Marsh, 574 F. Supp. 505, 514 (E.D. Mo. 1983), rev’d., 732 F.2d 1375 
(8th Cir. 1984) (holding that an Army Corps administrative decision was a “rulemaking 
decision” within the meaning of and subject to the APA) with Masur, supra note 297, at 512–
13 (stating that “the only cognizable exceptions that might exempt a military agency . . . from 
APA strictures are the narrow ones written into the statute itself” including military 
authority exercised in the field during “time of war”). 
 494  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1) (2012) (listing military departments under “agency” definition). 
 495  See supra Part IV.C.1. 
 496  See Breyer Oral Argument, supra note 336, at 35 (discussing the difficulty for judges to 
make to make these types of determinations). 
 497  5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (2012); 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(4) (2012).  
 498  See United States v. Ventura-Melendez, 321 F.2d. 320, 323 (2003) (holding that 
establishing a security zone is exempt from APA rules under 10 U.S.C. §§ 552–553). 
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a service member because it involved military affairs and public 
benefits.499 
Of course, any attempt to reconcile the APA with the modern 
military organization may run against significant headwinds within 
the DoD. And they will likely assert that this will only harm 
military readiness by exposing an increased number of activities to 
judicial review. But the APA has had an enormous impact in 
making governmental activity “more open, accountable, and 
responsive to the public than in any other country”500 and can play 
a powerful role in ensuring civilian control of the military.501 
CONCLUSION 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act, passed in 1986 in the aftermath of 
several military misadventures, managed to reduce interservice 
rivalry through emphasis on joint warfare but failed to reinforce 
civilian control over the military. Instead, it discouraged 
congressional involvement in the hard questions by increasing the 
authority and autonomy of geographic combatant commanders at 
the heart of the operational military. Today, Congress remains 
focused on the administrative military. We are witnessing increased 
executive drift facilitated by this Act and the two-military divide.  
This trend comes into sharper relief as the military looks to 
future conflicts and takes on new missions. The administrative 
military is legally and doctrinally at the operational military’s 
service, and its leadership is accountable when forces are not 
combat ready. But it is strange indeed to assign accountability when 
the administrative military lacks control over its own priorities, 
which are shaped by congressional preferences.   
When the Congress focuses solely on the administrative military, 
it abrogates its constitutional responsibility to be a coequal partner 
in answering the following questions: Should we be operating in 
hundreds of nations in such a manner? What is the precise scope of 
the AUMF? What is the desired end state? At the time of this 
 
 499  See McDonald v. McLucas, 371 F. Supp. 837, 840 (1973) (holding that the APA did not 
apply). 
 500 See JAMES RASBAND ET AL., supra note 298, at 223. 
 501  Id.  
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writing, we are still in the longest period of armed conflict in 
American history—when will this end? 
The answers to these questions will remain unsatisfactory 
absent a congressional awakening or renewed interest by the 
American public.  Our nation’s strong tradition of civilian control of 
the military is shaped more by historical practice and constitutional 
norms than by the few black letter legal provisions. As we look to 
the military’s future in increasingly dangerous times with growing 
pressures on civil-military relations, we must understand the 
military’s modern agency design and its consequences. Only then 
can we act to shape the future of civil-military relations and sustain 
a military that safeguards our national security while remaining 
subordinate to civilian leadership.  
The Congress owes it to the American people to engage with 
matters of state. Our nation’s strong tradition of civilian control of 
the military is shaped more by custom than law and cannot be taken 
for granted. And as the Supreme Court noted in Duncan v. 
Kahanamoku, “[t]he supremacy of the civil over the military is one 
of our great heritages.”502 
  
 
 502  327 U.S. 304, 325 (1945). 
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